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“ALL” IS NOT EVERYTHING: THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPREME
COURT’S RESTRICTION OF NATURAL GAS
CONVEYANCES IN BUTLER v. CHARLES POWERS
ESTATE EX REL. WARREN
MARK T. WILHELM*
“[Pennsylvanians] have been plagued with the ‘Dunham problem’ when
drafting attorneys . . . were not aware of the Dunham decision and pro-
ceeded under the nearly universal assumption that a reservation of min-
eral rights included reservation of oil and gas interest in the land.”1
I. EXCAVATING THE TRUE MEANING OF MINERALS: AN INTRODUCTION TO
MINERAL RIGHT CONVEYANCES
In late 2008, Bill Hartley leased the mineral rights below his family
farm in rural southwestern Pennsylvania to Range Resources, a natural gas
production company.2  The Amwell Township resident received a six-fig-
ure cash payment and a royalty percentage for the right to drill for the
natural gas trapped deep under his property in Marcellus shale.3  Hartley,
like many other Pennsylvania residents, is now realizing the immense
value of the natural gas beneath his feet.4  Signing bonuses and royalty
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, Villanova University School of Law; B.A. 2012,
University of Michigan.  I would like to thank my friends from the Villanova
University School of Law and the University of Michigan for their willingness to
provide thoughtful comments and advice throughout the process of writing this
Note.
1. Broughton v. Nw. Natural Gas Co., 2 Pa. D. & C.4th 226, 228 (Ct. Com. Pl.
1988) (applying Dunham Rule to Pennsylvania mineral conveyance).
2. See Eliza Griswold, The Fracturing of Pennsylvania, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 17,
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/20/magazine/fracking-amwell-town-
ship.html?pagewanted=all (describing how Texas company, Range Resources,
sought mineral rights in Amwell Township for purpose of drilling for natural gas
trapped in Marcellus Shale).
3. See id. (noting while Hartley was unwilling to disclose specific amount he
has received from natural gas well on his property, his cash bonus for signing lease
totaled over $110,000); see also ANTHONY ANDREWS ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
UNCONVENTIONAL GAS SHALES: DEVELOPMENT, TECHNOLOGY, AND POLICY ISSUES 1,
28 (2009), available at http://energy.wilkes.edu/PDFFiles/Library/CRS%20Re-
port%20on%20Shale%20Gas%20Issues.pdf (stating that in Pennsylvania, signing
bonuses for natural gas leases have skyrocketed from highs of $35 per acre in 2002
to $2,900 per acre in 2008).
4. See Griswold, supra note 2 (explaining Hartley is proponent of drilling for
Marcellus shale gas). But see James Loewenstein, Ward: Gas Company Financing Is
Preventing Residents from Getting Mortgages, DAILY REVIEW (Aug. 1, 2011), http://
thedailyreview.com/news/ward-gas-company-financing-is-preventing-residents-
from-getting-mortgages-1.1182565 (explaining mortgage recording confusion that
prevents some landowners from receiving mortgages on surface estate because nat-
ural gas companies have mortgaged mineral estate); Andrew Maykuth, Drilling and
(375)
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payments from natural gas companies are helping everyday Pennsylvani-
ans to make ends meet.5  However, these payments would not be possible
without the ability of private individuals like Hartley to profit from their
mineral right ownership.6
Pennsylvania has a long, rich history of commercial drilling for oil
and natural gas.7  The state today maintains a unique position in the drill-
ing industry as it sits atop the Marcellus Shale Formation.8  The Marcellus
History Intersect in the Marcellus Shale, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 17, 2013), http://arti-
cles.philly.com/2013-09-17/news/42151966_1_marcellus-shale-153-acre-farm-den-
nis-farm (discussing landowners that have leased their mineral rights but are not
receiving royalty payments because natural gas companies have decided not to
drill); Ian Urbina, Rush to Drill for Natural Gas Creates Conflicts with Mortgages, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 19, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/20/us/rush-to-drill-for-
gas-creates-mortgage-conflicts.html?pagewanted=all (discussing situations where
banks refuse to provide mortgages to landowners because of natural gas drilling
practices on land that may devalue land as collateral). See generally Documents: Mort-
gages and Gas Leases, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/us/drilling-down-documents-8.html#document/p67/a33452 (providing
documents revealing position of bankers, credit union officials, and insurers on
subject of natural gas lease relationship to mortgages).
5. See, e.g., Griswold, supra note 2 (discussing how Hartley used cash payment
to reroof two of his barns, to purchase farm machinery, and to build addition for
his ninety-four year old mother’s house); Clifford Krauss & Tom Zeller, Jr., When a
Rig Moves in Next Door, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/
11/07/business/energy-environment/07frack.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (re-
porting on one Pennsylvania woman who leased mineral rights to survive while
going through divorce). But see Jacqueline Feldman & Rebecca Droke, Shale Affect-
ing Sales, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 3, 2011), http://articles.philly.com/2011-09-03/
news/30109265_1_mineral-rights-marcellus-shale-surface-estate (discussing land-
owners that do not want to sell mineral rights and instead want to preserve land).
6. See Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 598 (Pa. 1893) (“Mining
rights are peculiar, and exist from necessity, and the necessity must be recog-
nized . . . .”); see also Erich Schwartzel, Pennsylvania Landowners Can Get Cash for
Mineral Rights, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (May 19, 2013, 12:05 AM), http://www.
post-gazette.com/stories/local/marcellusshale/pennsylvania-landowners-can-get-
cash-on-spot-for-mineral-rights-688190/ (explaining how some landowners who
have leased mineral rights and already received signing bonuses are also selling
their rights to royalty payments in exchange for upfront, lump sum payments).
7. See Daniel Yergin, The Pennsylvania Start-up that Changed the World, FORBES
(Sept. 3, 2009, 4:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/09/03/oil-daniel-yergin-
business-energy-oil.html (detailing early history of Pennsylvania oil drilling, includ-
ing first commercial oil well in United States).  Pennsylvania began producing oil
commercially in 1859. See Traditional Oil & Gas Industry, PA. INDEP. OIL & GAS
ASS’N, http://www.pioga.org/publication_files/pioga-traditional-industry-fact-
sheet.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (providing basic overview of historical and
current oil drilling in Pennsylvania).
8. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF FOSSIL ENERGY & NAT’L ENERGY TECH.
LAB., MODERN SHALE GAS DEVELOPMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: A PRIMER  21
(2009) [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS], available at http:/
/www.gwpc.org/sites/default/files/Shale%20Gas%20Primer%202009.pdf (detail-
ing Marcellus Shale Formation that stretches from New York to northern Tennes-
see and includes significant portions of Pennsylvania).  The Formation “covers an
area of 95,000 square miles at an average thickness of 50 ft to 200 ft.” Id. (citations
omitted). See generally Kristin M. Carter et al., Unconventional Natural Gas Resources
in Pennsylvania: The Backstory of the Modern Marcellus Shale Play, 18 ENVTL. GEOSCI-
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Shale, a rock formation approximately one mile beneath the Earth’s sur-
face, naturally contains large deposits of natural gas.9  However, drilling
for Marcellus shale gas has only recently become both commercially and
technologically practical.10  This new abundance of harvestable energy re-
sources, in the form of Marcellus shale gas, has led to the development of
widespread commercial drilling for natural gas throughout Penn-
sylvania.11  Supporters of drilling note that commercial production of nat-
ural gas yields massive economic benefits for the state.12  Yet, drilling
critics point to environmental concerns relating to the use of certain natu-
ral gas drilling techniques, especially hydraulic fracturing (fracking).13
ENCES 217 (2011), available at http://deg.aapg.org/Portals/0/documents/
EG11008.pdf (highlighting “critical issues” regarding history and commercial pro-
duction of Marcellus Shale Formation).
9. See Kevin Colosimo, Natural Gas Boom a Blessing for Pa., PHILA. INQUIRER
(Aug. 5, 2013, 1:08 AM), http://www.philly.com/philly/news/local/20130805_
Natural_gas_boom_a_blessing_for_Pa_.html (stating Marcellus Shale Formation is
second largest natural gas reserve in world).  To the extent this Note discusses the
formation at large, it refers to it as the “Marcellus Shale.”  To the extent this Note
discusses the sedimentary rock and the gas therein, it refers to it as “Marcellus
shale” or “Marcellus shale gas.” See Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren,
65 A.3d 885, 898 (Pa. 2013) (clarifying terminology used by court).
10. See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN SHALE GAS, supra note 8, at 21 (explain-
ing first commercially viable drilling in Marcellus Shale Formation occurred in
Pennsylvania in 2003, employing both horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing
techniques).
11. See Traditional Oil & Gas Industry, supra note 7 (stating Pennsylvania lands
contain over 350,000 oil and gas wells, with at least 70,000 active wells); see also
Andrew Maykuth, Pa.’s Natural Gas Rush, PHILA. INQUIRER (Apr. 3, 2011), http://
articles.philly.com/2011-04-03/business/29377352_1_marcellus-formation-
marcellus-shale-coalition-drilling (listing geographic areas of Marcellus shale gas
development and major natural gas companies operating within Pennsylvania).
12. Compare Colosimo, supra note 9 (noting Pennsylvania oil and gas industry
employs over 250,000 people and generates over $11 billion in economic activity),
with PA. ECON. LEAGUE OF SW. PA., LLC, ALLEGHENY CONFERENCE ON CMTY. DEV.,
THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE COAL INDUSTRY IN PENNSYLVANIA 31 (2010), http:
//www.alleghenyconference.org/PennsylvaniaEconomyLeague/PDFs/Economic
ImpactAnalyses/EconomicImpactOfCoalIndustryInPa0410.pdf (studying eco-
nomic impact of coal industry in Pennsylvania and finding contribution of over
41,500 jobs and $7.5 billion in economic activity). But see Kevin Begosby, Billions in
Pa. Gas Drilling Royalties Transform Lives, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE (Jan. 28, 2013),
http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/business/billions-in-pa-gas-drilling-royalties-
transform-lives-1.1435941 (noting that billions in royalty payments likely have
larger individual impact than impact on Pennsylvania’s overall economy). See gen-
erally Timothy Considine, Robert Watson, Rebecca Entler & Jeffrey Sparks, An
Emerging Giant: Prospects and Economic Impacts of Developing the Marcellus Shale Natural
Gas Play, INTERSTATE OIL & GAS COMPACT COMM’N 1 (2009), http://groundwork.
iogcc.org/sites/default/files/EconomicImpactsofDevelopingMarcellus.pdf (study-
ing future economic viability and impact of Marcellus shale gas in Pennsylvania).
13. See Stephen G. Osborn, Aver Vengosh, Nathaniel R. Warner & Robert B.
Jackson, Methane Contamination of Drinking Water Accompanying Gas-Well Drilling and
Hydraulic Fracturing, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A.  8172, 8172 (2011), http://
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3100993/ (arguing that fracking is re-
sponsible for, among other things, flammable tap water due to increased methane
levels); see also Will Bunch, Money, Politics and Pollution in Fracking Country, PHILA.
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Natural gas companies have historically bought, sold, and leased the
mineral rights of Pennsylvania lands for traditional natural gas drilling.14
With the recent technological availability of Marcellus shale gas, these nat-
ural gas companies have increased their efforts to secure the rights to
Pennsylvania’s subsurface minerals.15  Landowners who still own their
mineral rights have the option to sever mineral rights from the surface by
splitting ownership of the surface estate and mineral estate.16  Given the
commercial desirability of natural gas, in recent years, natural gas compa-
nies have executed thousands of deeds and leases with landowners that
convey the landowners’ mineral rights.17  This effort on the part of natural
INQUIRER (Jan. 16, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-01-16/news/36355296_
1_corbett-administration-marcellus-shale-pennfuture (discussing questionable per-
mitting processes for natural gas producers). But see Samuel C. Schon, Hydraulic
Fracturing Not Responsible for Methane Migration, 108 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S.A.
E664, E664 (2011), http://www.pnas.org/content/108/37/E664.full.pdf+html
(arguing that methane migration is natural and not caused by fracking). See gener-
ally Joseph A. Dammel, Note, Notes from Underground: Hydraulic Fracturing in the
Marcellus Shale, 12 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 773 (2011) (examining legal issues and
concerns regarding fracking in Pennsylvania); U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, MODERN
SHALE GAS, supra note 8, at 56–63 (describing scientific and technological
processes of fracking).
14. See, e.g., Ian Urbina, Jeremy Ashkenas & Jo Craven McGinty, Drilling Down:
Oil and Gas Leases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/2011/12/02/us/oil-and-gas-leases.html (providing interactive database of
over 111,000 oil and gas leases from across United States collected through open
records requests). See generally Unconventional Infrastructure Development in Penn-
sylvania, KEYSTONE ENERGY, http://www.keystoneenergyforum.com/uploads/files/
28/KEF%20Infrastructure.pdf (last visited Jan. 22, 2014) (overviewing, briefly, pro-
duction process of unconventional natural gas).
15. See Hannah Wiseman, Regulatory Adaptation in Fractured Appalachia, 21
VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 229, 240 (2010) (“Between 2008 and 2009, the number of
Marcellus wells drilled in Pennsylvania more than quadrupled.”).  States surround-
ing Pennsylvania have joined the drilling activity as natural gas trapped in
Marcellus shale becomes technologically accessible and commercially viable. See
id. But see Will Bunch, Pa. Fracking Boom Goes Bust, PHILA. INQUIRER (Sept. 12,
2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-09-12/news/41974274_1_fracking-boom-
penn-state-marcellus-center-marcellus-shale (discussing recent decline in natural
gas drilling likely caused by drop in natural gas prices).
16. See JOHN BORDEAU, 6 SUMM. PA. JUR.2D PROPERTY § 5:2 (2d ed. 2014) (not-
ing Pennsylvania’s acceptance of severable estates). See generally 2 TIFFANY REAL
PROPERTY § 587 (3d ed. 2014) (detailing individual ownership of strata beneath
given property); Carlos B. Masterson, Adverse Possession and the Severed Mineral Es-
tate, 25 TEX. L. REV. 139 (1946) (discussing severance of mineral estates and ap-
proaches to adverse possession of individual estates).
17. See Barnsdall v. Bradford Gas Co., 74 A. 207, 208 (Pa. 1909) (explaining
that in Pennsylvania mineral lease conveys “no permanent interest, property, or
estate in the land itself, but only in the [mineral] proceeds, and in such proceeds
not as realty, but as personal property, and his possession is the possession of the
owner”). But see Sandy Bauers, 2 Companies Pull out of Pa. Natural Gas Leases, PHILA.
INQUIRER (Jul. 17, 2013), http://articles.philly.com/2013-07-17/news/40614767_
1_property-owners-alliance-newfield-appalachia-pa-l-l-c-michele-siekerka (reporting
two major natural gas companies in Pennsylvania recently pulled out of contracts
with landowners citing business reasons and low market price of natural gas).
4
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gas companies to increase their rights to Marcellus shale gas has resulted
in lucrative lease and royalty payments to Pennsylvania landowners.18
Of course, the promise of economic gains has revived disputes regard-
ing newly valuable mineral rights across Pennsylvania.19  The recent eco-
nomic opportunity in natural gas has generated competition within the
state’s energy industry.20  Further, the lure of drilling for natural gas may
cause conflict between the surface owner and the owner of the mineral
estate.21  These disputes are often complicated by historical title defects to
the rights in question.22
18. See Frank Gamrat, Policy Brief, Marcellus Royalty Payments Rising Rapidly,
ALLEGHENY INST. FOR PUB. POLICY (May 30, 2013), http://www.alleghenyinstitute.
org/marcellus-royalty-payments-rising-rapidly/ (estimating massive 6,600% royalty
income increase to Pennsylvania mineral rights owners as result of natural gas drill-
ing in Marcellus Shale Formation during 2012, totaling approximately $731 mil-
lion).  For a natural gas contract to be valid in Pennsylvania, companies are
required to provide the owner of the mineral rights at least one-eighth royalty on
any natural gas produced. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 33.3 (2013) (outlining mini-
mum royalty requirement).
19. See Kevin C. Abbott & Nicolle R. Snyder Bagnell, Recent Decisions Affecting
the Development of the Marcellus Shale in Pennsylvania, 72 U. PITT. L. REV. 661, 678
(2011) (discussing how increased drilling for oil and natural gas causes larger
number of disputes between surface and subsurface owners).
20. See Tracie Mauriello, Battle Between Coal and Gas a Hot Issue in Pennsylvania,
PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE (Aug. 11, 2013, 4:00 AM), http://www.post-ga-
zette.com/stories/local/marcellusshale/battle-between-coal-gas-hot-issue-in-penn-
sylvania-698915/ (explaining that natural gas companies are lobbying state
governments for advantages compared to coal industry based on relatively clean
image of natural gas compared to coal). See generally Craig R. McCoy & Joseph
Tanfani, ‘Us vs. Them’ in Pa. Gaslands, PHILA. INQUIRER (Dec. 12, 2011, 11:13 PM),
http://www.philly.com/philly/news/special_packages/inquirer/marcellus-shale/
20111212_Us_vs__Them_in_Pa__Gaslands.html (detailing local political battles re-
garding drilling for Marcellus shale gas and effect of commercial lobbying on dis-
putes); Nicolle R. Snyder Bagnell, Environmental Regulation Impacting Marcellus Shale
Development, 19 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 177, 188–91 (discussing dispute resolution
between coal producers and natural gas producers).
21. See, e.g., Belden & Blake Corp. v. Commw. Dep’t of Conservation & Natu-
ral Res., 969 A.2d 528, 529–30 (Pa. 2009) (examining whether Department of Con-
servation can legally place conditions or restrictions on commercial development
of mineral estates located below state owned land); David Falchek, PPL Battles
Homeowners over Drilling Royalty Checks on Forgotten Land, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE
(Apr. 28, 2013), http://prod-admin1.scranton.atex.cniweb.net:8080/preview/
www/2.1188/2.612/1.1480554 (discussing dispute between electric corporation
and landowners over mineral rights related to abandoned rail line property). See
Stephen W. Saunders, Weighing the Risks and Rewards, PA. LAW. 18, 20 (Mar.–Apr.
2012) (explaining common law access to minerals that can create conflict between
owner of surface estate and owner of mineral estate if owners have divergent plans
for drilling).
22. See, e.g., Michael K. Vennum & Grant H. Hackley, Recognizing New Issues
Arising out of the Marcellus Shale Development—Avoiding Pitfalls—A Primer for Diligent
Oil and Gas Title Attorneys, 84 PA. B. ASS’N Q. 25, 31–33 (2013) (discussing process
of title washing where surface estate and mineral estate have been recombined
after being initially separated that can spur disputes to good title).
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One of the main concerns regarding a transfer of mineral rights is
identifying which minerals are contemplated by the conveyance.23
Broadly drafted mineral conveyances routinely give rise to disputes regard-
ing ownership of certain minerals.24  States vary as to their presumptive
inclusion of natural gas in the blanket term mineral.25 Butler v. Charles
Powers Estate ex rel. Warren26 provides an example of a dispute over owner-
ship of rights in natural gas.27  In Butler, the legal question was whether a
deed conveying the blanket term minerals, absent any evidence as to the
intent of the parties, presumptively included natural gas.28  The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court held that natural gas trapped in the Marcellus
Shale was not presumptively included in a conveyance of all minerals.29  In
doing so, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Dunham Rule, which it con-
sidered a longstanding rule of property in the state.30
This Note examines the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s opinion in
Butler and argues that the court examined the incorrect line of cases in its
analysis.31  Further, this Note argues that the Commonwealth should now
adopt a new definition of minerals that is more in line with the vast major-
ity of jurisdictions.32  Part II explains the conceptual background of min-
eral rights and the two approaches to mineral right presumptions in the
United States.33  Part III addresses how the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania arrived at its decision in Butler and explains how the state supreme
court misapplied past precedent in favor of a traditional scheme that sup-
23. See generally Ronald W. Polston, Mineral Ownership Theory: Doctrine in Disar-
ray, 70 N.D. L. REV. 541 (1994) (detailing theories of mineral ownership and argu-
ing for reclassification of mineral interests as incorporeal interests).
24. See generally K.A.D., Annotation, Severance of Title or Rights to Oil and Gas in
Place from Title to Surface, 146 A.L.R. 880 (1943) (detailing numerous cases involv-
ing disputes related to separating surface estate from mineral estate across United
States).
25. See generally A.S.M., Annotation, What Are “Minerals” Within Deed, Lease, or
License, 17 A.L.R. 156 (1922) (detailing case law regarding presumptive inclusion
and exclusion of certain substances in conveyance across jurisdictions in United
States).
26. 65 A.3d 885 (Pa. 2013).
27. See id. at 886 (stating allowance of appeal for question of whether reserva-
tion of one-half minerals includes natural gas).
28. See id. at 887 (acknowledging mineral rights were conveyed in 1881 with
no evidence to parties’ intent except for actual reservation).
29. See id.
30. See id. (upholding longstanding Dunham Rule, which presumptively ex-
cludes natural gas from broad conveyance of minerals).
31. For a discussion of a line of Pennsylvania cases calling the Dunham Rule
into question, see infra notes 140–50 and accompanying text.
32. For a discussion of the need to adopt the majority approach to presump-
tive conveyances of natural gas, see infra notes 151–60 and accompanying text.
33. For a further discussion of mineral rights and the different jurisdictional
approaches to the presumptive inclusion of natural gas in a conveyance of miner-
als, see infra notes 37–84 and accompanying text.
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ports natural gas companies.34  Part IV examines the questionable status
of the Dunham Rule as a rule of property in Pennsylvania and the need for
departing from the Rule.35  Finally, Part V explains how Pennsylvania citi-
zens and practitioners can navigate the Butler decision in past and future
land transactions.36
II. UNCOVERING A RULE FOR CONVEYANCES: THE ROLE OF NATURAL GAS
AS A PRESUMPTIVE MINERAL
Traditionally, by virtue of owning the surface of a parcel of land, a
landowner had an interest in a section of the Earth extending directly
from the surface of the property to the core.37  Yet, over time, states began
to move toward a more comprehensive understanding of property rights
in real estate.38  Pennsylvania, for example, now recognizes three different
estates in a given parcel of land: a surface estate, a mineral estate, and a
right to subjacent support.39  Each of these estates is separable, and an
34. For a further discussion of the facts, holding, and rationale of Butler, see
infra notes 85–116 and accompanying text.
35. For a discussion of precedent calling into question the Dunham Rule and
an argument for departure from the Rule, see infra notes 138–60 and accompany-
ing text.
36. For a discussion of the means to navigate the impact of Butler, see infra
notes 161–85 and accompanying text.
37. See Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co.,
171 U.S. 55, 60 (1898) (“The general rule of the common law was that whoever
had the fee of the soil owned all below the surface, and this common law is the
general law of the states and territories of the United States . . . .”); John G.
Sprankling, Owning the Center of the Earth, 55 UCLA L. REV. 979, 980–81 (2008)
(discussing role of ad coelom et ad inferos doctrine, concept of owning to heavens
and to core of earth, in developing theories of land ownership in United States).
Individual ownership of minerals located beneath the surface is somewhat unique
to the United States’ law. See EUGENE KUNTZ, LAW OF OIL & GAS § 2.1 (2013) (ex-
plaining that under civil law concepts, sovereign retained rights to subsurface min-
erals).  However, federal statutes granting individuals actual ownership of mineral
rights developed relatively slowly. See Del Monte Mining, 171 U.S. at 61 (“For nearly
a century there was practically no legislation on the part of congress for the dispo-
sal of mines or mineral lands.”).
38. See Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon, 25 A. 597, 598 (Pa. 1893) (“For-
merly a man who owned the surface owned it to the center of the earth.  Now the
surface of the land may be separated from the different strata underneath it, and
there may be as many different owners as there are strata.”).
39. See Gioia v. Gioia, 555 A.2d 1330, 1335 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (citing
Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 32 A.2d 227, 234–35 (Pa. 1943)) (noting, generally,
Pennsylvania’s recognition of separate estates in single parcel of land).  In Penn-
sylvania, oil and natural gas are “a part of the land while they are in place,” but
“can be severed from the ownership of the surface by grant or exception as sepa-
rate corporeal rights.” See Pa. Bank & Trust Co., Youngsville Branch v. Dickey, 335
A.2d 483, 485 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (citing Duquesne Natural Gas Co. v. Fefolt, 198
A.2d 608 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1964)).
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owner may sell or lease the interest in an individual estate, independent of
the other estates.40
Pennsylvania common law broadly defines the general term “min-
eral.”41  Consequently, while parties may intend to transfer rights to a cer-
tain estate, ambiguity regarding which substances are contained in a given
estate routinely gives rise to disputes.42  Especially problematic are convey-
ances that simply transfer the blanket term “minerals.”43  Given the rap-
idly increasing interest in Marcellus shale natural gas as a commercially
viable substance, parties are now scrutinizing vague deeds executed de-
cades ago to determine rights to natural gas.44  Absent specific language
contemplating a difference, courts treat oil and natural gas similarly due
to their similar nature and properties.45  But courts in different jurisdic-
tions have come to conflicting opinions regarding how to approach the
question of whether natural gas and oil are presumptively included in a
broad conveyance of mineral rights.46  The minority approach, generally
40. See Lillibridge v. Lackawanna Coal Co., 22 A. 1035, 1036 (Pa. 1891) (not-
ing that different strata beneath earth create different estates and each estate may
have separate owner); Hetrick v. Apollo Gas Co., 608 A.2d 1074, 1078 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1992) (“As with any estate in land, the owner of the mineral estate may convey
his entire bundle of rights in fee or may grant a mere portion thereof via lease-
hold.”). See generally Hallie Seegal, In North Carolina, Fracking Rights Rise to Surface,
REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/events/2013/02/08/in-north-
carolina-fracking-rights-rise-to-surface/ (stating concept of split estate was based on
sixteenth century English law that preserved monarch’s right to gold and silver
deposits beneath all land in kingdom).
41. See Griffin v. Fellows, 81 1/2 Pa. 114, 124 (1873) (“The term ‘minerals’
embraces everything not of the mere surface, which is used for agricultural pur-
poses; the granite of the mountain as well as metallic ores and fossils, are compre-
hended within it.” (citations omitted)).
42. See, e.g., In re Blue Coal Corp., Nos. 5–76–bk–01311, 5–78–bk–00604, Adv.
No. 5–10–ap–00149, 2010 WL 2754453, at *1 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. July 10, 2010) (ex-
amining whether to apply Dunham Rule analysis to previously decided bankruptcy
matter where mineral rights were sold as part of liquidated bankruptcy estate).
The question of whether the Dunham Rule applied was not ministerial and there-
fore the underlying case was closed. See Earth Conservancy v. Blue Coal Corp., No.
10cv1748, 2011 WL 662685, at *2 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. Feb. 14, 2011). See generally
C.V.V., Annotation, What Are “Minerals” Within Deed, Lease, or License, 86 A.L.R. 983
(1933) (listing substances that may give rise to debate regarding their status as
minerals in given conveyance).
43. See C.V.V., supra note 42 (discussing rules for interpreting “a conveyance
or exception of ‘minerals’ in a deed, lease, or license”).
44. See generally Leo N. Smith et al., Title Examination of Mineral Interests in Fee
Lands, 5C ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 13 (1977) (detailing terms, processes, and
instruments involved in mineral conveyances in United States).
45. See, e.g., Silver v. Bush, 62 A. 832, 833 (Pa. 1906) (relying on absence of
petroleum in mineral conveyance to demonstrate absence of natural gas); KUNTZ,
supra note 37, § 13.3 (grouping oil and natural gas for purposes of analyzing min-
eral conveyances).
46. See generally Daniel B. Kostrub & Roger S. Christenson II, Canons of Con-
struction for the Interpretation of Mineral Conveyances, Severances, Exceptions, and Reserva-
tions in Producing States, 88 N.D. L. REV. 649, 659–64 (2012) (summarizing six basic
methods for courts to interpret vague references to minerals in conveyance).
8
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termed the “Pennsylvania Approach,” presumptively excludes natural gas
from the term “minerals.”47  Conversely, the majority approach presump-
tively includes natural gas in the term “minerals.”48
A. Minority (Pennsylvania) Approach to a Conveyance of “Minerals”
The minority approach to the presumptive contents of a mineral es-
tate is that the estate does not contain natural gas absent clear evidence
that the contracting parties intended to convey natural gas.49  Courts rou-
tinely recognize Dunham v. Kirkpatrick50 as the seminal case regarding the
presumptive exclusion of natural gas in a conveyance of minerals.51  In
Dunham, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed whether reservation
of “all minerals” included oil.52  The court held that oil was presumptively
excluded from a reservation of all minerals because oil was not found in
the popular usage of the term minerals at the time of the conveyance.53
Subsequent courts applied the Dunham Rule to natural gas as well, noting
the similarities between oil and natural gas.54  Modern courts applying the
minority rule generally point to the rule’s objective of interpreting con-
tracts as intended at the time of the conveyance.55  However, critics of the
47. See Millard F. Ingraham, Comment, Meaning of Minerals in Grants and Reser-
vations, 30 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 343, 345–46 (1957) (listing numerous juris-
dictions rejecting Dunham Rule and stating “[t]he Dunham Rule has found little
support in other jurisdictions”).
48. See William L. Powers, Mines and Minerals—Mineral Reservation—Surface
Ownership Includes at Surface Substances and Those Near Surface Substances Whose Re-
moval Involves Destruction of Surface by Any Reasonable Method Known at Time Extraction
Is Planned, 12 ST. MARY’S L.J. 580, 585 (1980) (describing majority and minority
rules for interpreting ambiguous language in mineral conveyance).
49. See generally A.S.M., supra note 25 (treating Pennsylvania separately for
purposes of natural gas and oil due to its unique opinion regarding presumptive
exclusion of natural gas and oil in vague mineral conveyance).
50. 101 Pa. 36 (1882).
51. See Robert J. Burnett, The Status Quo Restored, 35 PA. LAW. 38, 38 (2013)
(discussing importance of consistent application of Dunham Rule to Pennsylvania).
52. See Dunham, 101 Pa. at 37 (“In the article of agreement, and also in the
deed, was inserted . . . ‘[e]xcepting and reserving all the timber suitable for sawing;
also, all minerals; also, the right of way to take off such timber and minerals.’”).
53. See id. at 44 (“Certainly, in popular estimation petroleum is not regarded
as a mineral substance any more than is animal or vegetable oil, and it can, indeed,
only be so classified in the most general or scientific sense.”).  The Dunham court
further suggested that the drafters of the conveyance “should have known that they
were using that word [minerals] in a manner not sanctioned by the common un-
derstanding of mankind.” Id.
54. See, e.g., Silver v. Bush, 62 A. 832, 833 (Pa. 1906) (relying on absence of
petroleum in mineral conveyance to demonstrate absence of natural gas); KUNTZ,
supra note 37, § 13.3 (grouping oil and natural gas for purposes of analyzing min-
eral conveyances).
55. See Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 898 (Pa.
2013) (citing Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Moore, 2 Whart. 477, 493 (Pa. 1837))
(“[W]hen interpreting private deeds and contracts, the ‘question is to be deter-
mined not by principles of science, but by common experience directed to the
discovery of intention.’”).
9
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minority approach point to courts reaffirming the Dunham Rule as simply
reinforcing the Rule’s status as an outdated rule of property.56
B. Majority Approach to a Conveyance of “Minerals”
The vast majority of jurisdictions consider a transfer of all minerals
presumptively to include natural gas, unless the conveying instrument as a
whole produces ambiguity.57  Initially, many courts throughout the coun-
try applied the Dunham Rule to mineral disputes.58  However, as the oil
and gas industry developed, states quickly moved away from applying the
Dunham Rule.59  Over sixty-five years ago, courts began to note the vast
rejection of the Dunham Rule in favor of a more inclusive view of
minerals.60
These later courts generally adopted one of two approaches to sup-
port the notion that natural gas and oil are included in the meaning of the
word minerals.61  First, some courts applied a standard referring to the
56. See id. at 900 n.1 (Saylor, J., concurring) (“Pennsylvania post-Dunham deci-
sions have ‘adhered to that view, not so much because the court was sure that in its
ordinary sense the term ‘minerals’ did not include oil and gas, but because the
previous decision had become a rule of law on which land titles in that state were
based.’” (quoting 1A NANCY SAINT-PAUL, SUMMERS OIL & GAS § 7:16 (3d ed.
2012))).
57. See SUMMERS OIL & GAS, supra note 56, § 7:16 (explaining whether grant
or exception of minerals includes oil and gas); C. C. Marvel, Annotation, Oil and
Gas as “Minerals” Within Deed, Lease, or License, 37 A.L.R.2D 1440 (1954) (surveying
acceptance of oil and gas as minerals within different jurisdictions throughout
United States).
58. See, e.g., McKinney’s Heirs v. Cent. Ky. Nat. Gas. Co., 120 S.W. 314, 315–16
(Ky. 1909) (citing Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 47 (1882)) (holding natural
gas not presumptively included in conveyance of minerals); Huie Hodge Lumber
Co. v. R.R. Lands Co., 91 So. 676, 678 (La. 1922) (applying Dunham Rule and
holding, due to circumstances of conveyance, natural gas and oil were not in-
cluded in conveyance); Detlor v. Holland, 49 N.E. 690, 692–93 (Ohio 1898) (ap-
plying Dunham Rule and holding natural gas and oil were not presumptively
included in conveyance).
59. See, e.g., Scott v. Laws, 215 S.W. 81, 82 (Ky. 1919) (recognizing “all miner-
als” as “all inorganic substances which can be taken from the land”), overruling
McKinney’s Heirs, 120 S.W. 314; Warren v. Clinchfield Coal Corp., 186 S.E. 20, 21
(Va. 1936) (“The weight of authority is to the effect that petroleum, oil and gas are
minerals, though there is respectable authority upholding what is known as the
‘Pennsylvania Doctrine,’ which lays down a contrary rule.”); Williamson v. Jones,
19 S.E. 436, 441 (W. Va. 1894) (“[A]uthorities now very generally—universally . . .
hold petroleum to be a mineral, and as much a part of the realty as timber, coal, or
iron ore, except that in proper cases its mobility as a subterranean liquid must be
taken into consideration . . . .”).
60. See Branham v. Minear, 199 S.W.2d 841, 846 (Tex. Civ. App. 1947)
(“[T]hat the term ‘minerals’ includes oil and gas is so well settled as to need no
citation of authorities . . . .”).
61. See, e.g., Lovelace v. Sw. Petroleum Co., 267 F. 513 (6th Cir. 1920) (inter-
preting Kentucky law and holding that natural gas and oil are presumptively in-
cluded in conveyance of minerals unless language of grant indicated anything less
than transfer of all minerals); Nephi Plaster & Mfg. Co. v. Juab Cnty., 93 P. 53, 55
(Utah 1907) (“[M]inerals, prima facie at least, are not confined to the metals.”).
10
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ordinary meaning of the word, which can be derived from readily available
resources such as dictionaries.62  Second, other courts suggested a more
scientific approach to defining the word minerals that would also include
oil and natural gas.63  In either case, courts generally adopted a definition
of mineral that includes any inorganic substance for which mining or drill-
ing is commercially profitable.64  Critics of the majority approach gener-
ally claim courts applying the majority rule are contravening the intent of
the contracting parties because if the parties intended to include natural
gas, the conveyance would have specifically contemplated the substance.65
C. Pennsylvania’s Application of Mineral Rules
Given Pennsylvania’s status as the birthplace of commercial oil and
gas drilling, its courts decided some of the earliest mineral disputes.66
Based on the Dunham decision in 1882, Pennsylvania common law has de-
veloped the Dunham Rule.67  The Dunham Rule interprets a general con-
veyance of all minerals to presumptively exclude oil and natural gas,
unless contradicted by parol evidence.68  However, through the years,
62. See Murray v. Allard, 43 S.W. 355, 359 (Tenn. 1897) (suggesting that defi-
nition of minerals is most appropriate when taken from dictionaries and other
similar authorities, and finding that “bulk of mankind” does not view “minerals” as
only including metals).
63. See, e.g., Matthews v. Dep’t of Conservation, 96 N.W.2d 160, 164 (Mich.
1959) (considering definition of minerals based on division of all matter into
“animal, mineral, and vegetable kingdoms”); Sult v. Hochstetter Oil Co., 61 S.E.
307, 311 (W. Va. 1908) (“Legally and scientifically oil and gas are universally held
to be minerals.”); cf. Armstrong v. Lake Champlain Granite Co., 42 N.E. 186, 187
(N.Y. 1895) (considering whether granite is mineral ore for purposes of convey-
ance and noting that, scientifically, granite is not mineral ore).
64. See, e.g., Robinson v. Wheeling Steel & Iron Co., 129 S.E. 311, 312 (W. Va.
1925) (“‘Minerals,’ when used in a deed, may include every inorganic substance
which can be extracted from the earth for profit.”); accord Horse Creek Land &
Mining Co. v. Midkiff, 95 S.E. 26, 27 (W. Va. 1918) (“The term ‘mineral,’ when
employed in conveyancing in this state, is understood to include every inorganic
substance which can be extracted from the earth for profit . . . .”).
65. See, e.g., Dunham v. Kirkpatrick, 101 Pa. 36, 44 (1882) (“[W]e may be very
sure that when [the parties] made their contract . . . they did not intend to reserve
the mineral oil that might afterward be found in the land, otherwise that intention
would have been expressed in no doubtful terms.”).
66. See Abbott & Bagnell, supra note 19, at 661 (stating that Pennsylvania
courts have some of “oldest jurisprudence” in United States relating to oil and
gas).
67. For a discussion of the development of the Dunham Rule, see supra notes
50–54 and accompanying text.  Some courts note that the historical origin of the
Dunham Rule may actually stretch as far back as 1836. See Butler v. Charles Powers
Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 889 (Pa. 2013) (noting that Dunham line of cases
began in Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34 (Pa. 1836)).
68. See Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398 (Pa. 1960) (citing Dun-
ham, 101 Pa. at 44) (“[I]f, in connection with a conveyance of land, there is a
reservation or an exception of ‘minerals’ without any specific mention of natural
gas or oil, a presumption, rebuttable in nature, arises that the word ‘minerals’ was
not intended by the parties to include natural gas as oil.”).
11
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Pennsylvania courts have not always applied the Dunham Rule consistently
and have instead regularly utilized the majority approach to conveyance
interpretations.69
1. Applying the Dunham Rule: The Minority Approach
The line of Pennsylvania cases spawned by the Dunham decision relies
on the transfer of minerals as a common law interpretation of a con-
tract.70  Courts begin their analyses with the notion that the term “miner-
als” should be read according to the understanding of the parties at the
time of the agreement.71  Therefore, to understand the parties’ intent, the
specific language used in the conveyance should be interpreted in light of
the everyday usage of its terms.72  If the parties’ intent or understanding is
unclear from the language of the conveyance, parol evidence may be used
to overcome the presumption that natural gas is not included in the trans-
fer of mineral rights.73
2. An Inconsistent Application: The Majority Approach
Pennsylvania courts have not always been consistent in refusing to rec-
ognize natural gas as a mineral.  Before the Dunham decision, Penn-
sylvania courts found that oil was a mineral based on the common
69. See Scott M. Farnsworth, Comment, Including Geothermal Resources Within
the Mineral Estate: The Need for a Statutory Rule of Presumption, 1978 BYU L. REV. 593,
593 n.1 (1978).  For a discussion of Pennsylvania courts applying the majority ap-
proach to oil and natural gas, see infra notes 74–84 and accompanying text.
70. See Brant M. Laue, Interpretation of ‘Other Minerals’ in a Grant or Reservation
of a Mineral Interest, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 618, 629 (1986) (citing Dunham v. Kirkpat-
rick, 101 Pa. 36 (1882)) (explaining some courts attempt to determine intent of
parties when deciding whether natural gas is mineral).
71. See Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Moore, 2 Whart. 477, 491 (Pa. 1837) (“The best
construction is that which is made by viewing the subject of the contract, as the
mass of mankind would view it; for it may be safely assumed that such was the
aspect in which the parties themselves viewed it.”).  Interestingly, when examining
real property conveyances generally, Pennsylvania does not look to the intent of
the parties, but to the meaning of the words in the conveyance. See Lawson v.
Simonsen, 417 A.2d 155, 158 (Pa. 1980) (“[W]e seek to ascertain not what the
parties may have intended by the language but what is the meaning of the
words . . . .” (quoting Brookbank v. Bendum-Trees Oil Co., 131 A.2d 103, 107 (Pa.
1957))). Contra Commonwealth v. Fitzmartin, 102 A.2d 893, 894 (Pa. 1954)
(“Where a deed or agreement or reservation therein is obscure or ambiguous, the
intention of the parties is to be ascertained in each instance not only from the
language of the entire written instrument . . . but also from a consideration of the
subject matter and of the surrounding circumstances.” (citing Price v. Confair, 79
A.2d 224, 226 (Pa. 1951))).
72. See Preston v. S. Penn Oil Co., 86 A. 203, 204 (Pa. 1913) (holding that
mineral is “not per se a term of art or trade, but of general language,” and, pre-
sumably, should therefore be interpreted in “the ordinary, popular sense”).
73. See Highland, 161 A.2d at 399 (requiring “clear and convincing” evidence
to overcome presumption).
12
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understanding of the substance.74  Further, following the Dunham deci-
sion, Pennsylvania courts continued to recognize oil as a mineral.75  This
interpretation quickly extended to natural gas as well.76  Consistent with
the majority approach, courts justified natural gas and oil as minerals be-
cause of their nature as inorganic, commercially viable substances.77  This
line of cases carried such weight that the Supreme Court of the United
States even cited these Pennsylvania decisions as support for the concept
that oil and natural gas were minerals.78
The landmark decision, U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge,79 also nudged Penn-
sylvania toward the majority interpretation of natural gas as a mineral
74. See, e.g., Appeal of Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198, 201 (1879) (citing Funk v. Hal-
deman, 53 Pa. 229, 248–49 (1866) (declaring, in certain terms, mineral includes
oil)); Funk, 53 Pa. at 248–49 (noting that until science advanced, oil was consid-
ered mineral as future courts would likely agree).
75. See, e.g., Hamilton v. Foster, 116 A. 50, 52 (Pa. 1922) (discussing how par-
ties did not dispute characterization of oil and gas as minerals); Marshall v. Mellon,
36 A. 201, 201 (Pa. 1897) (citing Stoughton, 88 Pa. at 198) (noting status of oil as
mineral); Blakley v. Marshall, 34 A. 564, 565 (Pa. 1896) (citing Stoughton, 88 Pa. at
201) (recognizing oil as mineral while situated beneath ground); Gill v. Weston, 1
A. 921, 923 (Pa. 1885) (discussing petroleum as mineral).
76. See Westmoreland & Cambria Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724, 725
(Pa. 1889) (recognizing validity of natural gas as mineral based on master’s find-
ing).  The Westmoreland court qualified the classification of natural gas as a mineral
because natural gas, like oil, is a mineral “feroe naturoe.” See id.  A landowner there-
fore only had an interest in natural gas and oil as long as it remained under the
landowner’s property. See id. (noting when property owner had interest in natural
gas and oil); accord Hamilton, 116 A. at 52; see also Barnard v. Monongahela Natural
Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907) (discussing analogy between ownership of wild
animals and ownership of oil and gas, stating, “[t]his may not be the best rule; but
neither the Legislature nor our highest court has given us any better”).
77. See Gill, 1 A. at 923 (“[Petroleum] is a mineral substance obtained from
the earth by a process of mining, and lands from which it is obtained may, with
propriety, be called mining lands.”); cf. Hendler v. Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 58 A.
486, 487 (Pa. 1904) (examining whether word mineral includes sand, explaining,
“[a mineral] may be defined as any inorganic substance found in nature, having
sufficient value, separated from its situs as part of the earth, to be mined, quarried,
or dug for its own sake or its own specific uses”), rev’d on other grounds by Hall v.
Del., Lackawanna & W. R.R. Co., 113 A. 669 (Pa. 1921); see also PAPCO, Inc. v.
United States, 814 F. Supp. 2d 477, 494 (W.D. Pa. 2011) (interpreting Pennsylvania
law regarding whether mineral includes sandstone, stating, “[w]hen the parties
intend to define minerals by its commercial sense, substances included within this
definition have their own value that is apart from the rest of the land”).
78. See Burke v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 234 U.S. 669, 677 (1914) (citing Gill, 1 A. at
923; Funk, 53 Pa. at 248–49).  The Court subsequently held that “[p]etroleum
lands are mineral lands within the meaning of that term” as it relates to railroad
land grants. Id. at 711; see also Luse v. Boatman, 217 S.W. 1096, 1099–1101 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1919) (discussing history of Pennsylvania’s mineral rights decisions, in-
cluding Dunham, and noting that Pennsylvania now recognizes natural gas and oil
as minerals before holding both substances are minerals).
79. 468 A.2d 1380 (Pa. 1983).  Several courts have referred to this Hoge deci-
sion as “Hoge II.” See Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885,
888 (Pa. 2013) (referring to Hoge as Hoge II).  For the purposes of this Note, the
decision will be referred to as the Hoge decision.
13
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through the court’s analysis of the ownership of natural gas trapped in a
stream of coal.80  In Hoge, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the
owner of a stream of coal also owned the coalbed gas situated inside of the
coal stream, despite the fact that ownership of the coal stream had been
separated from the immediately adjacent strata.81  The court reasoned
that because coal was unequivocally a mineral, substances trapped within
the conveyed mineral were also conveyed by the mineral grant.82  The
owner of any other strata had no right to access the coalbed gas, and
therefore, the coalbed gas belonged to the owner of the coal.83  This own-
ership theory applies even if the owner of the coal did not explicitly re-
ceive a conveyance of the coalbed gas trapped inside of the coal.84
III. BUTLER V. CHARLES POWERS ESTATE EX REL. WARREN: BURYING THE
QUESTION TO PRESERVE TRADITION
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Butler decided that the Dunham
Rule is still the law of Pennsylvania and, consequently, that natural gas is
presumptively not a mineral for the purpose of private conveyances.85
The court was asked to decide whether a deed executed in 1881 conveying
80. See Hoge, 468 A.2d at 1384–85 (holding, generally, that coalbed gas was
conveyed through deed conveying all minerals).  The Hoge decision was the first
major court case involving ownership of coalbed gas in the United States. See Sa-
rah Kathryn Farnell, Methane Gas Ownership: A Proposed Solution for Alabama, 33 ALA.
L. REV. 521, 525–26 (1982) (discussing court’s decision in Hoge that “coalbed
methane is a separate substance from coal”).  One commentator argues that the
Hoge holding may have been largely based on public policy concerns rather than
some underlying legal framework. See Nancy P. Regelin, Comment, Coalbed Gas
Ownership in Pennsylvania—A Tenuous First Step with U.S. Steel v. Hoge, 23 DUQ. L.
REV. 735, 736 (1985) (examining, in-depth, Hoge decision and its possible underly-
ing motives).
81. See Hoge, 468 A.2d at 1383 (holding owner of individual strata also has
right to minerals located inside of particular strata).  The court also explained that
coalbed gas was scientifically similar to natural gas, with the main difference be-
tween the two substances being the different strata in which they were located. See
id. at 1382 (“The gas which has commonly been referred to as ‘natural gas’ is
generally found in strata deeper than coal veins, though it shares many of the
characteristics of coalbed gas.”). Contra Amoco Prod. Co. v. S. Ute Indian Tribe,
526 U.S. 865, 880 (1999) (holding, for federal lands, coalbed gas is not included in
conveyance of coal in which coalbed gas is located).
82. See Hoge, 468 A.2d at 1383 (citing Kier v. Peterson, 41 Pa. 357 (1861))
(“[A]s a general rule, subterranean gas is owned by whoever has title to the prop-
erty in which the gas is resting.”).
83. See id. (“[S]uch gas as is present in coal must necessarily belong to the
owner of the coal, so long as it remains within his property and subject to his
exclusive dominion and control.”).
84. See id. at 1382 (providing text of coal severance deed at issue, which did
not contemplate coalbed gas).  The Hoge decision proves to have a significant im-
pact on Pennsylvania landowners today. See Jason P. Webb, Pennsylvania & Coalbed
Methane: Reviving the Traditional Willingness to Protect Surface Owners, 27 TEMP. ENVTL.
L. & TECH. J. 35, 43–45 (2008) (discussing aftermath of Hoge decision).
85. For a discussion of the reasoning of the Butler court, see infra notes
99–116 and accompanying text.
14
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 59, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol59/iss2/5
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-2\VLR205.txt unknown Seq: 15 30-APR-14 12:04
2014] NOTE 389
the broad term “minerals” contemplated or included natural gas trapped
in Marcellus shale.86  The court’s decision rested on a centuries-old tradi-
tion of recognizing the Dunham Rule’s application to mineral estates and
continued the Commonwealth’s support of commercial gas production.87
A. Facts and Procedure
John and Mary Butler owned a 244-acre parcel of land in Susque-
hanna County.88  A predecessor in title to the property took title from
Charles Powers by deed in 1881.89  The deed in question contained a res-
ervation of one half of “the minerals and Petroleum Oils” to Charles Pow-
ers, but the language of the reservation did not specifically contemplate
natural gas.90
The Butlers filed a complaint in quiet title alleging ownership of all
minerals beneath the property, including natural gas, through adverse
possession.91  In response, William and Craig Pritchard, the rightful heirs
to Charles Powers’s estate, sought a declaratory judgment that the original
reservation included one-half of the natural gas trapped in Marcellus shale
beneath the property.92  The Butlers filed a preliminary objection, in the
form of a demurrer, to the request for a declaratory judgment, arguing
that in Pennsylvania a deed reserving the general term “minerals” does not
86. For a discussion of the facts of the Butler case, see infra notes 88–98 and
accompanying text.
87. For a discussion of Pennsylvania’s judicial and legislative preference for
mineral laws and rulings favoring commercial producers over landowners, see infra
notes 117–36 and accompanying text.
88. See Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 887 (Pa.
2013) (discussing appellants in case).
89. See id. (discussing history of deed).
90. See id.  The language of the deed read as follows:
[O]ne-half the minerals and Petroleum Oils to said Charles Powers his
heirs and assigns forever together with all and singular the buildings,
water courses, ways, waters, water courses, rights, liberties, privileges, her-
editaments, and appurtenances, whatsoever there unto belonging or in
any wise appertaining and the reversions and remainders rents issues and
profits thereof; And also all the estate right, title interest property
claimed and demand whatsoever there unto belonging or in any wise ap-
pertaining in law equity or otherwise however of in to or out of the same.
Id. (alteration in original).
91. See id. (claiming full ownership of mineral rights as opposed to ownership
of one-half of mineral rights as conveyed by deed).  The Butlers originally filed
their claim in the Susquehanna Court of Common Pleas. See id. (discussing proce-
dural history of case).
92. See id. at 887–88 (discussing appellee’s response to appellant’s com-
plaint).  At first, there was some difficulty in locating the heirs of Charles Powers
Estate. See id. at 887 (noting Pritchards came forward as heirs to Charles Powers
Estate on September 21, 2009).  It is not unusual for the owner of the surface
estate and the owner of the mineral estate to be complete strangers. See Christo-
pher S. Kulander, Common Law Aspects of Shale Oil and Gas Development, 49 IDAHO L.
REV. 367, 369 (2013) (“Over time, in many places . . . the mineral estate owner and
the surface estate owner would be completely unknown to one another.”).
15
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presumptively include natural gas.93  The trial court sustained the demur-
rer and denied the Pritchards’ request for declaratory relief.94  The Pritch-
ards appealed to the Superior Court of Pennsylvania.95
The Superior Court overturned the trial court’s decision and re-
manded several evidentiary issues to the trial court including whether nat-
ural gas trapped in Marcellus shale can be considered a mineral.96  The
Butlers appealed to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania for a review of
whether the remand for an evidentiary hearing was proper.97  The Su-
preme Court held that the Dunham Rule continued to be the valid rule in
Pennsylvania, that natural gas trapped in Marcellus shale is presumptively
not a mineral, and that a remand for an evidentiary hearing was
unnecessary.98
B. Burying Unfavorable Precedent in Favor of an Archaic Rule
In Butler, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court began its analysis by
quickly deciding that the Dunham Rule continues to govern mineral con-
veyances in Pennsylvania.99  The court reasoned that the Dunham Rule has
never been explicitly questioned, and therefore it continues to be a long-
standing rule of property in the state.100  Since no party offered justifica-
93. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 888 (relying on holding from Highland v. Common-
wealth, 161 A.2d 390 (Pa. 1960)).
94. See id. (explaining trial court sustained demurrer because of Dunham
Rule, Pennsylvania’s longstanding rebuttable presumption that natural gas is not
presumptively included in conveyance of “minerals”).
95. See generally Brief & Reproduced Record of Appellants, Butler v. Charles
Powers Estate, 29 A.3d 35 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (No. 1795 MDA 2010), 2010 WL
7141068 (briefing appeal regarding Preliminary Objections to Pennsylvania Supe-
rior Court).
96. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 888 (explaining that Superior Court remanded issues
of (1) whether Dunham Rule applies to Marcellus shale gas, (2) whether Marcellus
shale is mineral, and (3) whether Marcellus shale is similar enough to coal that
Hoge applies).
97. See id. at 888–89 (discussing appellant’s appeal after adverse decision in
Pennsylvania Superior Court).  The Pennsylvania Supreme Court was asked to
decide:
In interpreting a deed reservation for ‘minerals,’ whether the Superior
Court erred in remanding the case for the introduction of scientific and
historic evidence about the Marcellus [S]hale and the natural gas con-
tained therein, despite the fact that the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
has held (1) a rebuttable presumption exists that parties intend the term
‘minerals’ to include only metallic substances, and (2) only the parties’
intent can rebut the presumption to include non-metallic substances.
Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 41 A.3d 854, 854 (Pa. 2012) (per
curiam) (alteration in original) (granting allowance of appeal).
98. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 887 (“[W]e respectfully hold that the Superior Court
erred in ordering the remand for an evidentiary hearing and reinstate the order of
the trial court.”).
99. See id. at 897 (“[W]e reaffirm that the [Dunham R]ule continues to be the
law of Pennsylvania.”).
100. See id. (“[W]e recognize that the Dunham Rule has now been an unal-
tered, unwavering rule of property law for 131 years; indeed its origins actually
16
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tions for overturning the Dunham Rule, the supreme court simply
reaffirmed it.101
Next, the court turned to whether the Dunham Rule applies to natural
gas trapped inside of the Marcellus Shale Formation.102  The court held
that the application of the Dunham Rule properly applies to Marcellus
shale gas.103  Additionally, the supreme court held that under the Dunham
Rule, it is not possible for Marcellus shale gas to be classified as a mineral,
offering two principles upon which it made this decision.104  First, in
Pennsylvania, only substances of a metallic nature constitute a mineral for
the purpose of a private deed.105  Second, private deeds are contracts that
must be interpreted based on the intent of the parties to the contract.106
Therefore, the court held that the remand for an evidentiary hearing was
unnecessary because evidence of whether Marcellus shale is a mineral
could not possibly aid in ascertaining the parties’ initial intent in the
conveyance.107
The Butler court next reversed the Superior Court’s decision regard-
ing Hoge and held that Hoge was not controlling in regards to natural gas
trapped within the Marcellus Shale.108  The supreme court began by not-
ing that Hoge in no way limited or overruled the Dunham Rule, despite
date back to the Gibson decision, placing the rule’s age at 177 years.”).  The Butler
court further noted that “[a] rule of property long acquiesced in should not be
overthrown except for compelling reasons of public policy or the imperative de-
mands of justice.” See id. (quoting Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 399
n.5 (Pa. 1960)).
101. See id. (“We see no reason, nor has any party or court provided us with
one, to depart from this entrenched rule.”).
102. See id. (determining that it must “next examine whether the Dunham
Rule applies to this appeal”).
103. See id. (stating that court “readily hold[s]” that Dunham Rule applies).
104. See id. at 897–98 (“We hold that the Superior Court erred in ordering
the remand and further that Marcellus shale natural gas cannot, consistent with
the Dunham Rule, be considered a mineral for private deed purposes.”).
105. See id. at 898 (citing Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34, 41–42 (Pa. 1836))
(“[A]nything of a non-metallic nature would not be considered a mineral for pri-
vate deed purposes . . . .”).
106. See id. (“[W]hen interpreting private deeds and contracts, the ‘question
is to be determined not by principles of science, but by common experience di-
rected to the discovery of intention.’” (quoting Schuylkill Nav. Co. v. Moore, 2
Whart. 477, 493 (Pa. 1837))).
107. See id. (“[T]o the extent the Superior Court ordered an evidentiary hear-
ing with expert testimony concerning Marcellus shale natural gas, and the scien-
tific nature thereof, such an order violated the Dunham jurisprudence.”).
According to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the Dunham Rule certainly applies
to some private deeds executed prior to the Dunham decision. See id. at 898 n.9
(rejecting argument that because deed in question was executed in 1881, prior to
creation of Dunham Rule in 1882, Dunham Rule is inapplicable).  It is not entirely
clear whether the Dunham Rule applies to deeds executed prior to 1870. See id.
(noting Dunham Rule was created based on deed executed in 1870).
108. See id. at 898 (“[W]e disagree with the Superior Court that because the
natural gas at issue in this case is contained within the Marcellus Shale, the Hoge II
decision . . . become[s] relevant or controlling.”).
17
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Hoge’s holding that coalbed natural gas is a mineral.109  The Butler court
put forth two reasons why the Hoge decision only concerned the right to
coal and the right to ventilation of natural gas trapped in the coal.110
First, the Hoge decision concerned the right to ventilate coal, which natu-
rally only applies to coal.111  Second, the Hoge court inherently distin-
guished coalbed gas from natural gas because the Hoge court upheld a
landowner’s right to drill through coal to obtain non-coalbed natural
gas.112  Because no party advanced an argument that suggested natural gas
trapped in Marcellus shale was different from natural gas contemplated by
the Dunham Rule, the Butler court held that the Dunham Rule applies to
Marcellus shale gas and that Marcellus shale gas is not a mineral.113
Finally, the Butler court explained that even though the methods used
to extract Marcellus shale gas are exactly the same as those used to extract
coalbed gas, this fact had no impact on the court’s Dunham Rule analy-
sis.114  To the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, regardless of whether
109. See id. (noting Hoge court held natural gas as mineral “without discussing
the Dunham Rule”).  Therefore, the supreme court found “no merit to any aver-
ment that Hoge II sub silentio abrogated the Dunham Rule.” See id.  However, the
Hoge court was aware of the Dunham Rule as the court cited the Dunham decision
“for a general pronouncement of the rules of deed and contract construction.” See
id. at 898 n.10 (suggesting that had Hoge court intended to overrule Dunham Rule,
it would not have cited to Dunham to support its holding).
110. See id. at 898 (noting distinction is critical for two reasons: safety and
inherent legal distinction between substances).  Until the 1970s, coalbed gas was a
dangerous waste product from coal mining that was not commercially or techno-
logically viable. See generally Romeo M. Flores, Coalbed Methane: From Hazard to Re-
source, 35 INT’L J. COAL GEOLOGY 3 (1998) (discussing history of coalbed gas and its
transition from waste product to valuable resource).
111. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 898–99 (explaining reversion only applies to right
of ventilation due to “extremely dangerous and volatile nature” of coalbed gas).
Contra U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1384 (Pa. 1983) (“The potential
for reversion of the situs, however, does not diminish the character of the coal as
property of its grantee, or of the gas contained therein as a mineral ferae naturae
resting inside the coal owner’s property and falling within the dominion and con-
trol of the coal estate.”). See generally Wendy B. Davis, Coalbed Methane: Degasifica-
tion, Not Ventilation, Should Be Required, 2 APPALACHIAN J.L. 25 (2003) (arguing
against ventilation of coalbed gas due to gas’s environmental impact and commer-
cial potential).
112. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 899 (noting also that Hoge court recognized scien-
tific, chemical similarities between coalbed gas and natural gas). See generally E.T.
Slonecker et al., Landscape Consequences of Natural Gas Extraction in Allegheny and
Susquehanna Counties, Pennsylvania, 2004-2010, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY (2013),
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/of/2013/1025/OFR2013_1025.pdf (explaining
both Marcellus shale gas and coalbed gas are scientifically methane gas).
113. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 899 (“Appellants . . . explicitly note that Marcellus
shale natural gas is merely natural gas that has become trapped within the
Marcellus Shale . . . .”).
114. See id. (citing Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34, 41 (Pa. 1836)) (recognizing
fracking is used to “obtain both coalbed gas and Marcellus shale natural gas,” and
explaining that Dunham Rule addresses “the common understanding of the sub-
stance itself, not the means used to bring those substances to the surface”).  In
other contexts, courts have considered whether a deed allows certain types of min-
18
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Marcellus shale is a mineral, and regardless of whether natural gas is
trapped within Marcellus shale, natural gas remains a non-mineral.115  Be-
cause the Dunham Rule was controlling and the Hoge analysis did not ap-
ply, the supreme court reinstated the order of the trial court and sustained
the Butlers’ preliminary objections regarding the reservation to Charles
Powers.116
C. Maintaining an Old Rule to Protect Commercial Producers
The Butler court’s holding reinforced two consistent themes regard-
ing Pennsylvania oil and gas litigation.  First, the Butler court followed
Pennsylvania tradition in upholding the Dunham Rule as a longstanding
rule of property.117  Second, the Butler decision continued the more mod-
ern Pennsylvania tradition of tailoring oil and gas law to the benefit of
commercial producers.118
1. Butler Upholds Outdated Tradition
The Butler decision was largely based on upholding a nineteenth-cen-
tury tradition rather than upholding the logic underlying the Dunham
Rule.119  Pennsylvania courts that have examined the Dunham Rule con-
sistently highlight the fact that it is a longstanding rule of property within
the state.120  This trend continued with the Butler court, which emphasized
ing. See, e.g., Heidt v. Aughenbaugh Coal Co., 176 A.2d 400, 400 (Pa. 1962) (“[W]e
are called upon to determine an issue oft recurring in recent years: whether under
the terms and provisions of a lease of mineral rights strip or open mining of such
minerals is permissible.”); Amerikohl Mining Co., Inc. v. Peoples Natural Gas Co.,
860 A.2d 547, 553 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding, in light of circumstances, deed
did not contemplate surface mining).
115. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 899 (finding “no merit” to argument that natural
gas trapped in Marcellus shale is any more mineral than traditional natural gas).
116. See id. (“[W]e find no reason to apply Hoge II to this appeal, and, thus, no
need to remand this case for fact-finding.”).
117. For a discussion of the Butler court’s analysis of the Dunham Rule focus-
ing on the traditional acceptance of the rule, see infra notes 119–23 and accompa-
nying text.
118. For a discussion of Pennsylvania’s preferential treatment of commercial
oil and gas producers, see infra notes 124–36 and accompanying text. See generally
Symposium, ‘Shale’ We Drill?  The Legal and Environmental Impacts of Extracting Natu-
ral Gas from Marcellus Shale, 22 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 204–23 (2011) (discussing
state and federal regulations regarding commercial Marcellus Shale drilling).
119. For a discussion of Pennsylvania’s pattern of extending the Dunham
Rule, see infra notes 120–23 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., Highland v. Commonwealth, 161 A.2d 390, 398–99 (Pa. 1960)
(noting, impliedly, that Dunham Rule had been law of Pennsylvania for seventy-
seven years); Bundy v. Myers, 94 A.2d 724, 726 (Pa. 1953) (citing Silver v. Bush, 62
A. 832, 833 (Pa. 1906)) (“[Dunham Rule] has now been the law of this State for
seventy years and is still no less a rule of property which is not to be disturbed.”);
Preston v. S. Penn Oil Co., 86 A. 203, 204 (Pa. 1913) (“[Dunham Rule] has been
the law of this state for 30 years, and very many titles to land rest upon it.”); Silver,
62 A. at 833–34 (“[Dunham Rule] was part of the law of the state when the deeds in
question were made, and to some extent at least, as was said by the learned judge
19
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the longstanding tradition of the Dunham Rule.121  The Butler court’s anal-
ysis of whether the Dunham Rule remained viable in Pennsylvania focused
entirely on the continuous use of the Rule since the nineteenth cen-
tury.122  It appears that the Butler court’s reaffirmation of the Dunham
Rule was heavily influenced by the age of the Rule as opposed to its logic,
its practical application, or the general understanding of the word “min-
eral” today.123
2. Butler Favors Commercial Producers
Traditionally, common law understandings of mineral rights have
placed Pennsylvania landowners at a disadvantage as compared to com-
mercial producers of natural gas.124  Further, the Pennsylvania legislature
has historically adopted statutes that support commercial production.125
below, it had become a rule of property on which many titles in Western Penn-
sylvania rested.”).
121. For a discussion of the Butler court’s determination that the Dunham
Rule is a longstanding rule of property, see supra notes 99–101 and accompanying
text.
122. See Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 897 (Pa.
2013) (reasoning for viability of Dunham Rule in modern application).  The court
held that “neither the Superior Court nor Appellees have provided any justifica-
tion for overruling or limiting the Dunham Rule and its longstanding progeny that
have formed the bedrock for innumerable private, real property transactions for
nearly two centuries.” Id.
123. See id. at 899 (Saylor, J., concurring) (“[S]ince Dunham has effectively
served to establish a governing rule of property law in Pennsylvania for over a
century, too many settled expectations rest upon it for the courts to upset it retro-
actively.”).  Even Justice Saylor found the rationale for the original Dunham deci-
sion questionable when examined in a modern light. See id. (“I find the original,
nineteenth-century rationale for the Dunham Rule to be cryptic, conclusory, and
highly debatable.”).
124. See Thomas A. Mitchell, The Future of Oil and Gas Conservation Jurispru-
dence: Past as Prologue, 49 WASHBURN L.J. 379, 417 (2010) (“[T]he Pennsylvania
courts have largely sided with producers in holding that the Oil and Gas Act
preempts local land-use regulation which could be used to address the impacts to
roads and community infrastructure from development and production.”); Webb,
supra note 84, at 35 (noting negative impact of Hoge decision on Pennsylvania
landowners).
125. See Jivaji More´, Comment, Come Shale Away: Navigating the “Business Friend-
liness” of Regulatory Environments in the Marcellus Shale and Albertan Oil Sands, 33 NW.
J. INT’L L. & BUS. 393, 431–37 (2013) (examining recent developments in Penn-
sylvania oil and gas law and comparing oil and gas regulatory schemes of Penn-
sylvania and Alberta, Canada); Michael Wood, A Look at Other States Shows Marcellus
Impact Fee Shortchanges Pennsylvanians, PA. BUDGET & POLICY CTR. (Aug. 8, 2013),
https://pennbpc.org/sites/pennbpc.org/files/PA-Impact-Fee-Compared-to-TX-
WV-8-8-2013-final.pdf (comparing Pennsylvania’s Impact Fee to other states’ taxes
on natural gas production and finding Pennsylvania maintains near lowest tax
rates in country). But see Susan Phillips, Legislative Proposal Aims to Re-unite Land-
owners with Mineral Rights, NPR STATE IMPACT (Mar. 26, 2013, 5:45 PM), http://
stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2013/03/26/legislative-proposal-aims-to-re-
unite-landowners-with-mineral-rights/ (detailing Senate Bill 258 which would allow
certain landowners to file quiet title action to reunite mineral estate with surface
estate).  Critics of the Bill claim it would destabilize property interests across the
20
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In recent years, as natural gas drilling and production have increased,
Pennsylvania’s courts have become more actively involved in mineral dis-
putes, consistently favoring commercial producers over landowners.126
Recently, Pennsylvania appellate courts have increased profits for nat-
ural gas companies at the expense of landowners and upheld a grant of
power to commercial producers.127  In one decision, the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court shifted the burden of production costs associated with the
development of natural gas to landowners by charging the costs against
the landowners’ contractual royalty.128  This decision effectively under-
state and significantly decrease drilling operations. See id. (offering criticism of
Bill).  Many states have successfully implemented similar dormant mineral statutes.
See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 883.220 (West 2013) (allowing reclamation of mineral
rights after twenty year period without production); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 554.291 (West 2013) (declaring mineral rights abandoned after twenty years of
inactivity and allowing reclamation by surface owner); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 57-
229 (West 2013) (declaring mineral abandoned after twenty three years without
public expression of ownership); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 84, § 271.1 (West 2013)
(providing for judicial sale of minerals abandoned for period of fifteen years). See
generally John M. Smith, The Prodigal Son Returns: Oil and Gas Drillers Return to Penn-
sylvania with a Vengeance Are Municipalities Prepared?, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 1 (2011) (ana-
lyzing regulatory scheme of Pennsylvania and its relationship to return of
commercial drilling to state).
126. Cf. Backwater Props., LLC. v. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC, No.
1:10CV103, 2011 WL 1706521, at *1–2 (N.D. W. Va. May 5, 2011) (discussing pro-
cedural issues regarding alleged mineral right “Bid Rigging Plan” by natural gas
company).  The lawsuit was terminated by a stipulation dated March 28, 2013. See
Stipulation of Voluntary Dismissal of All Claims by Plaintiffs, Backwater Props.,
LLC. v. Range Resources-Appalachia, LLC, No. 1:10-CV-00103-IMK, 2011 WL
1706521 (N.D. W. Va. May 5, 2011). See generally Nathaniel I. Holland, Pennsylvania
Oil and Gas Update, 19 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 539 (2013) (discussing recent stat-
utes and court decisions regarding Pennsylvania oil and gas law).
127. See Huntley & Huntley v. Borough Council, 964 A.2d 855, 865 (Pa. 2009)
(“The state’s interest in oil and gas development is centered primarily on the effi-
cient production and utilization of the natural resources in the state.” (quoting Bd.
of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Bowen/Edwards Assocs., 830 P.2d 1045, 1057 (Colo. 1992)
(en banc))).
128. See Kilmer v. Elexco Land Servs., 990 A.2d 1147, 1158 (Pa. 2010) (hold-
ing that royalty owners are responsible for proportional production costs); see also
Michael Morris, Note, Buyer’s Remorse over Your Pennsylvania Gas Lease?  The Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court Upholds Meager Royalty Payments and Protects the Profitability of
Marcellus Gas Drilling in Kilmer v. Elexco Land Services, Inc., 23 VILL. ENVTL. L.J.
25, 37–47 (2012) (examining Kilmer decision in detail); Marie Cusick, Pa. Landown-
ers Feel Cheated by Royalty Payments from Fracking, NPR (July 29, 2013, 4:47 PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=206728504 (discussing ef-
fect of Kilmer and lack of royalty payments to Pennsylvania residents); Landowners
Concerned About Disappearing Royalties (WENY News Broadcast May 29, 2013), availa-
ble at http://youtu.be/s4fbpORf8Zc (profiling diminishing oil and gas lease roy-
alty payments to Bradford County landowners). Contra Kropa v. Cabot Oil & Gas
Corp., 609 F. Supp. 2d 372, 379–80 (M.D. Pa. 2009) (interpreting 58 PA. STAT.
ANN. § 33 (West 2013)) (“Although the lease technically does provide for a one-
eighth royalty, it then proceeds to explain that costs will be deducted from that
amount.  The royalty then becomes less than one-eighth and a violation of the
plain language of the statute.”). See generally Abrahm Lustgarten, How Oil and Gas
Drillers Avoid Paying Royalties to Landowners, PAC. STANDARD (Aug. 30, 2013), http://
21
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mines the statutory provision granting landowners a minimum royalty per-
centage from natural gas recovered from their mineral estate.129  The
supreme court has also recently affirmed natural gas companies’ right to
continue drilling by permitting these companies to retain their rights to
minerals in certain leases so long as a well is producing any profit, regard-
less of how small.130  Finally, the intermediate appellate court upheld a
Pennsylvania law that gave certain natural gas companies the power of em-
inent domain.131
The Butler decision was an extension of Pennsylvania’s tendency to
favor the commercial production of oil and natural gas.132  Pennsylvania’s
natural gas companies overwhelmingly expressed their interest in main-
www.psmag.com/environment/oil-gas-drillers-avoid-paying-royalties-landowners-
65236/ (discussing alleged reductions of royalty payments to landowners through
underpayments and leases that limit landowners’ rights to audit payments).  The
Kilmer court emphasized, however, that as a check on potentially fraudulent prac-
tices, landowners “can seek a court ordered accounting.” Kilmer, 990 A.2d at 1158.
129. See Press Release, State Reps. Matthew Baker, Garth D. Everett, Sandra
Major & Tina Prickett, Area Lawmakers Drafting Measure to Clarify Minimum Roy-
alty Payments (June 29, 2013), available at http://www.reppickett.com/NewsItem.
aspx?NewsID=17889 (“Long before the Marcellus Shale was discovered as a major
natural gas deposit, a 1979 state law guaranteed a minimum royalty payment of
one-eighth for oil, natural gas, or gas of any other designation.  This was enacted
to ensure fairness and protect landowners from deceptive leases.”).
130. See T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil Co. v. Jedlicka, 42 A.3d 261, 277–78 (Pa.
2012) (holding that if natural gas well pays profit, however small, profit will be
considered producing in paying quantities and continue certain gas leases); see also
Caldwell v. Kriebel Res. Co., 72 A.3d 611, 615–16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2013) (holding oil
and gas leases impose no duty to produce paying quantities unless explicitly con-
templated by lease).  Recently, whether natural gas companies have a right to ex-
tend oil and gas leases has been the subject of frequent litigation. See, e.g., Stewart
v. SWEPI, LP, 918 F. Supp. 2d 333, 340–41 (M.D. Pa. 2013) (finding installation of
well immediately prior to natural termination of lease may be for speculation as
opposed to profit); Heasley v. KSM Energy, Inc., 52 A.3d 341, 343, 345 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2012) (holding “oil and gas lease calling for a flat rental as opposed to a per-
centage royalty” after initial term constitutes tenancy at will).
131. See Robinson Twp. v. Commonwealth, 52 A.3d 463, 487–88 (Pa. Commw.
Ct. 2012) (upholding 58 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 3241, which grants certain corpora-
tions limited power of eminent domain in conjunction with drilling operations).
However, the Robinson court also declared several legislative actions granting natu-
ral gas companies special treatment unconstitutional. See, e.g., id. at 480–85 (over-
turning 58 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 3304, which mandated certain zoning
requirements in accordance with statute).
132. See e.g., 4 PA. CODE § 6.432(1)(ii) (2013) (stating Governor’s Marcellus
Shale Advisory Commission shall recommend policies regarding “[e]fforts neces-
sary to promote the efficient, environmentally sound and cost-effective develop-
ment of Marcellus Shale and other unconventional natural gas resources”); cf. W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 5B-2H-2(b) (West 2013) (“The Legislature declares that facilitat-
ing the development of business activity directly and indirectly related to develop-
ment of the Marcellus shale serves the public interest of the citizens of this state by
promoting economic development and improving economic opportunities for the
citizens of this state.”).
22
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taining the Dunham Rule as the law of Pennsylvania.133  These companies
claimed that thousands of oil and gas leases across the Commonwealth
could be in jeopardy if the Dunham Rule was overturned.134  Specifically,
they claimed that in conjunction with the purchase and lease of oil and
gas rights, natural gas companies routinely conduct extensive title searches
with the Dunham Rule in mind.135  Natural gas companies claimed that if
the supreme court overturned the Dunham Rule, their right to certain
mineral estates might be in jeopardy and would certainly become the sub-
ject of litigation.136  Therefore, in upholding the Dunham Rule, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court maintained the strong position of commercial gas
producers and denied landowners the potential opportunity to reclaim
their rights to Marcellus shale gas.137
IV. THE CANARY IN THE MINE: UNDERSTANDING THE IMPACT OF BUTLER
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision in Butler continues the
longstanding tradition of upholding the Dunham Rule, despite a line of
Pennsylvania cases that find oil and natural gas to be minerals.138  In order
for Pennsylvania to return property rights to landowners, it should adopt
the majority approach and declare natural gas a mineral.139
133. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Am. Ass’n of Prof’l Landmen in Support
of Appellants at 13, Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885 (Pa.
2013) (No. 27 MAP 2012), 2012 WL 8681648 (“[Dunham Rule] provides a clearer
and superior resolution of ownership issues than alternative approaches.”); Brief
of Amici Curiae Chief Oil & Gas LLC et al. in Support of Reversal at 13–16, Butler
v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885 (Pa. 2013) (No. 27 MAP 2012),
2012 WL 8681643 (arguing that large number of conveyances would be impacted
by any change to Dunham Rule); Brief of Amicus Curiae Marcellus Shale Coal. at
21–23, Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885 (Pa. 2013) (No.
27 MAP 2012), 2012 WL 8681642 (arguing that departure from Dunham Rule
would create massive wave of litigation in Pennsylvania); Brief for Amici Curiae Pa.
Indep. Oil & Gas Ass’n et al. in Support of Appellants at 23, Butler v. Charles
Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885 (Pa. 2013) (No. 27 MAP 2012), 2012 WL
8681644 (“The reliance placed on the principles underlying the Dunham rule as a
rule of property for the last 175 years compels its reaffirmance.”).  No amici curiae
briefs were filed in support of the Appellees. See Docket, Butler v. Charles Powers
Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885 (Pa. 2013) (No. 27 MAP 2012).
134. See supra note 133.
135. See id.
136. See Zack Needles, ‘Mineral’ Rights Could Apply to Shale, PITTSBURGH POST-
GAZETTE (Oct. 3, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.post-gazette.com/stories/busi-
ness/legal/mineral-rights-could-apply-to-shale-317353/ (discussing impact of po-
tentially overturning Dunham Rule in identifying rightful owners of natural gas for
purpose of royalty payments).
137. See supra note 133. R
138. For a discussion of precedent that calls into question the Butler decision
and the validity of the Dunham Rule, see infra notes 140–50 and accompanying
text.
139. For a further discussion of why Pennsylvania should disregard the Dun-
ham Rule, see infra notes 151–60 and accompanying text.
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A. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court Adopts the Wrong Precedent
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Butler incorrectly on two
grounds.  First, the Dunham Rule should be overruled because of subse-
quent Pennsylvania decisions.140  Second, even if the Dunham Rule is alive
and well, the Butler court incorrectly dismissed the Hoge decision in its
analysis.141
1. Pennsylvania Courts Recognize Natural Gas as a Mineral
Pennsylvania courts have consistently reiterated their commitment to
upholding longstanding rules of property to maintain legal predictabil-
ity.142  However, even after the Dunham decision in 1882, numerous Penn-
sylvania courts have concluded that oil and natural gas are in fact
minerals.143  Further, courts outside of Pennsylvania have long considered
140. For a discussion of a line of Pennsylvania cases discussing oil and natural
gas as minerals, see infra notes 142–46 and accompanying text.
141. For a discussion of Hoge’s application to Marcellus Shale, see infra notes
147–50 and accompanying text.
142. See Smith v. Glen Alden Coal Co., 32 A.2d 227, 233–34 (Pa. 1943) (“A
rule of property long acquiesced in should not be overthrown except for compel-
ling reasons of public policy or the imperative demands of justice.”); see also In re
Borsch’s Estate, 67 A.2d 119, 122–23 (Pa. 1949) (noting “right of property” had
become “firmly imbedded in our law”); Madden v. Gosztonyi Savings & Trust Co.,
200 A. 624, 631–32 (Pa. 1938) (refusing to change understanding of tenants by the
entireties due to concept being “fixed rule of property”).
143. See, e.g., White v. N.Y. State Natural Gas Corp., 190 F. Supp. 342, 346–48
(W.D. Pa. 1960) (“Once severed from the realty, however, gas and oil, like other
minerals, become personal property.”); In re Bruner’s Will, 70 A.2d 222, 224 (Pa.
1950) (“Oil in place, being a mineral, is part of the realty, and it is like coal or any
other natural product which in situ forms part of the land.” (citing In re Stoughton,
88 Pa. 198 (1878))); McIntosh v. Ropp, 82 A. 949, 955 (Pa. 1912) (“[I]t is settled in
this state that oil and gas contained in or obtainable through the land are miner-
als.” (citing Marshall v. Mellon, 36 A. 201 (Pa. 1897); Westmoreland & Cambria
Natural Gas Co. v. DeWitt, 18 A. 724 (Pa. 1889); Gill v. Weston, 1 A. 921 (Pa. 1885);
Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198)); Kelly v. Keys, 62 A. 911, 913 (Pa. 1906) (referencing oil as
mineral); Blakley v. Marshall, 34 A. 564, 565 (Pa. 1896) (“[O]il in place is a min-
eral, and, being a mineral, it is part of the realty.”); Guthrie v. Guthrie, 7 A.2d 137,
139 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1939) (“[O]il in place is a mineral. . . .” (citing Stoughton, 88 Pa.
at 201)); Rockwell v. Keefer, 39 Pa. Super. Ct. 468, 476 (1909) (“[W]e have estab-
lished the proposition that oil and gas are minerals. . . .”); In re McLean’s Estate, 85
Pa. D. & C. 129, 132 (Orphans’ Ct. Wash. Cnty. 1952) (“Oil in place, being a min-
eral, is part of the realty, and it is like coal or any other natural product which in
situ forms part of the land.” (citing Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198)); McManus v. Acklin, 62
Pa. D. & C. 527, 530 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1947) (“It is well settled in this State that oil and
gas contained in or obtained through the land are minerals.  This mineral is con-
fined in certain underlying strata and is a part of the land in the same manner as
underlying coal or other minerals.” (citations omitted) (citing Marshall, 36 A. 201;
Westmoreland, 18 A. 724; Gill, 1 A. 921; Stoughton 88 Pa. 198)); Thornbury v. Forbes,
7 Pa. D. & C. 184, 185 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1925) (“In Stoughton’s Appeal, following the
well-known case of Funk v. Haldeman, it is held that oil is a mineral. . . .” (citations
omitted)); In re Forestry Reservation Commission, 28 Pa. C.C. 145 (Pa. Att’y Gen.
1903) (stating definition of minerals which implicitly includes petroleum “was ex-
pressly approved by the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court” (citing Griffin v. Fellows,
24
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the Dunham decision overruled based on subsequent Pennsylvania deci-
sions.144  Interestingly, even the court in Butler noted that several Penn-
sylvania statutes included natural gas in their definition of minerals.145
81 1/2 Pa. 114 (1873))); Appeal of Moore, 4 Pa. D. 703, 705 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1895)
(“Oil is a mineral.” (citations omitted) (citing Gill, 1 A. 921; Dunham v. Kirkpat-
rick, 101 Pa. 36, 43 (1882); Stoughton, 88 Pa. at 201; Funk v. Haldeman, 53 Pa. 229
(1866))).  For further discussion of Pennsylvania cases finding that oil and natural
gas are minerals, see supra notes 74–84 and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., N. Pac. R.R. v. Soderberg, 188 U.S. 526, 534–35 (1903) (discuss-
ing petroleum as mineral, stating, “[t]he cases are far too numerous for citation,
and there is practically no conflict in them” (citing Westmoreland, 18 A. 724; Gill, 1
A. 921; Funk, 53 Pa. 229; Gibson v. Tyson, 5 Watts 34 (Pa. 1836))); Ohio Oil Co. v.
Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1900) (noting Pennsylvania’s acceptance of petro-
leum as mineral (citing Westmoreland, 18 A. 724)); Lovelace v. Sw. Petroleum Co.,
267 F. 504, 509 (E.D. Ky. 1919) (“[A]ccording to the popular sense of the word,
‘minerals’ includes petroleum . . . .  [T]he cases are unanimous that it does [in-
clude petroleum], except the case of Dunham v. Kirkpatrick . . . .”), aff’d, 267 F. 513
(6th Cir. 1920); see also McCombs v. Stephenson, 44 So. 867, 868–69 (Ala. 1907)
(noting Pennsylvania courts have deviated from Dunham Rule (citing Hendler v.
Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 58 A. 486, 487 (Pa. 1904); Gill, 1 A. 921; Murray v. Allred,
43 S.W. 355, 359 (Tenn. 1897))); Mo. Pac. R.R. Co. v. Strohacker, 152 S.W.2d 557,
562 (Ark. 1941) (discussing Dunham Rule, stating, “[s]ubsequent[ ] Pennsylvania
courts treated gas and oil as minerals”); People ex rel. Carrell v. Bell, 86 N.E. 593,
594 (Ill. 1908) (“In some of the states petroleum forms a very valuable part of the
natural wealth and has been given careful consideration by the courts, and they
have uniformly held, so far as the authorities we have examined show, that it
should be classed as a mineral.” (citing Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198)); Crain v. West, 229
S.W. 51, 52 (Ky. 1921) (“Oil in place in the land is a mineral and part of the land
itself, and, so far as it relates to the questions to be considered, is similar to coal,
iron, lead, or other solid mineral substances which may be in lands.” (citing Funk,
53 Pa. at 249; Stoughton, 88 Pa. 198)); Barker v. Campbell-Ratcliff Land Co., 167 P.
468, 469 (Okla. 1917) (noting that Pennsylvania recognizes natural gas as mineral
and stating that Dunham Rule had been overruled in Pennsylvania by later Penn-
sylvania decisions (citing Gill, 1 A. 921)); Texas Co. v. Daugherty, 176 S.W. 717, 719
(Tex. 1915) (“It is no longer doubted that oil and gas within the ground are min-
erals.”); Carothers v. Mills, 233 S.W. 155, 157 (Tex. Civ. App. 1921) (stating “the
more recent Pennsylvania cases” have held oil and natural gas presumptive miner-
als); Nephi Plaster & Mfg. v. Juab Cnty., 93 P. 53, 55 (Utah 1907) (listing numerous
cases for proposition that term minerals is not limited to metallic ores (citing Gill,
1 A. 921; Griffin, 81 1/2 Pa. 114)); State ex rel. Atkinson v. Evans, 89 P. 565, 568
(Wash. 1907) (noting Pennsylvania’s acceptance of oil and gas as minerals (citing
Gill, 1 A. 921; Funk, 53 Pa. 229)).
145. See Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 897 (Pa.
2013) (refusing to recognize statutes defining natural gas as mineral, such as Mu-
nicipalities Planning Code, as sufficient authority to overrule Dunham Rule).  The
Municipalities Planning Code, adopted by the Pennsylvania legislature, defines
minerals as:
[A]ny aggregate or mass of mineral matter, whether or not coherent.
The term includes, but is not limited to, limestone and dolomite, sand
and gravel, rock and stone, earth, fill, slag, iron ore, zinc ore, vermiculite
and clay, anthracite and bituminous coal, coal refuse, peat and crude oil
and natural gas.
53 PA. CONS. STAT. § 10107 (2013) (emphasis added).
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Yet, the Butler decision itself failed to cite, consider, or reject a single
Pennsylvania case that recognized oil and natural gas as minerals.146
2. Hoge Analysis Applies to the Marcellus Shale
Even if the line of Pennsylvania cases finding natural gas to be a min-
eral fails, the logic of the Hoge court should still apply to Marcellus shale
gas.  According to the Hoge court, for natural gas to be presumptively in-
cluded in a conveyance of minerals, it does not need to be explicitly con-
templated in the conveyance as long as it is trapped inside of a mineral
that is conveyed.147  Assuming Marcellus shale is a mineral, under the
Hoge analysis, when Marcellus shale is conveyed, it logically follows that the
natural gas trapped in the shale should also be conveyed.148
The Butler court stated that it was examining the question of whether
the Hoge decision would apply to natural gas trapped inside of Marcellus
shale.149  Yet, the court dismissed this argument by simply stating that nat-
ural gas trapped inside of Marcellus shale is scientifically no different than
traditional natural gas.150  Consequently, the court incorrectly shifted the
issue from whether Marcellus shale is a mineral itself to whether natural
gas trapped inside of Marcellus shale is a mineral.  As a result of this shift,
the supreme court failed to actually answer the question of whether
Marcellus shale itself is a mineral, which would implicate a Hoge analysis.
146. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 897 (claiming that no reason has been provided to
justify departing from Dunham Rule).  The Butler court additionally stated, “neither
the Superior Court nor Appellees have provided any justification for overruling or
limiting the Dunham Rule and its longstanding progeny that have formed the bed-
rock for innumerable private, real property transactions for nearly two centuries.”
Id. But see Coolspring Stone Supply Inc. v. Cnty. of Fayette, 929 A.2d 1150, 1157
n.9 (Pa. 2007) (noting Pennsylvania cases cited in support of argument that oil is
mineral).
147. For a discussion of the Hoge decision and its reasoning, see supra notes
79–84 and accompanying text; cf. Consolidation Coal Co. v. White, 875 A.2d 318,
327 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (“It is the owner of the coal who owns the chamber or
space enclosing that coal.” (citing Westerman v. Pa. Salt Mfg. Co., 103 A. 539, 541
(Pa. 1918))).
148. For a discussion of the Hoge decision and its reasoning, see supra notes
79–84 and accompanying text. But see Joel Burcat & Andrew Bockis, Pa. Stance on
Dunham Rule Confounds Pa. Mining Industry, LAW360 (May 30, 2013, 1:52 PM),
http://www.saul.com/media/article/3569_PHILA-1471184%20-%20Burcat360ar-
ticle%20-%201.pdf (questioning whether Butler holding limiting minerals to metal-
lic substances puts mineral status of substances such as coal, limestone, and shale
in limbo).
149. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 896 (claiming Hoge “is distinguishable and inappli-
cable”).  For a further discussion of Hoge, see supra notes 79–84 and accompanying
text.
150. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 896.  Ironically, the Butler court explained that
Marcellus shale gas is scientifically similar to ordinary natural gas for purposes of
discrediting Hoge, yet earlier in the opinion rejected the argument that whether
natural gas is a mineral should be determined by science.
26
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B. Pennsylvania Should Adopt the Majority Approach
In its decision, the Butler court implicitly rejected a holding that
would end the Dunham Rule for any future conveyance, but maintain the
Rule for any conveyance prior to the change.151  The court simply rea-
soned that the Dunham Rule is a longstanding rule of property, and there-
fore many conveyances have been based on this Rule.152  This reasoning is
in accordance with Pennsylvania’s legal tradition that longstanding rules
of property should not be disturbed.153
Nevertheless, departing from the Dunham Rule would benefit the
state of Pennsylvania.154  Application of the Hoge standard to Marcellus
shale would be best for Pennsylvania citizens because it would allow them
to claim the financial benefits associated with the natural gas beneath the
land.155  Additionally, a change in the Dunham Rule would benefit practic-
ing attorneys by making the natural gas presumption consistent with the
popular understanding of minerals.156  Pennsylvania should take this op-
151. See Brief of Appellees at 28, Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren,
65 A.3d 885 (Pa. 2013) (No. 27 MAP 2012), 2012 WL 8681646 (arguing in alterna-
tive that supreme court could make change to Dunham Rule only prospectively).
152. For a discussion of the Butler court’s reasoning, see supra notes 99–116
and accompanying text.
153. For a discussion of Pennsylvania’s strict stare decisis commitment regard-
ing rules of property, see supra note 119–23 and accompanying text.
154. See Laura Legere, DCNR to Collect Money from Drillers Who Harvest Gas
Under Public Streams, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE (June 4, 2012), http://thetimes-trib-
une.com/news/dcnr-to-collect-money-from-drillers-who-harvest-gas-under-public-
streams-1.1324697 (discussing state of Pennsylvania pursuing ownership of natural
gas royalties from landowners that lease mineral rights surrounding public water-
ways); Robert Swift, DCNR Fueled with Gas Revenue, SCRANTON TIMES-TRIBUNE (Aug.
28, 2013), http://thetimes-tribune.com/news/dcnr-fueled-with-gas-revenue-1.
1542946 (noting Department of Conservation and Natural Resources receives ap-
proximately one-third of its total funding from oil and gas royalty payments).
155. But see A.J. Panian, Property Owners Concerned About Rights, TRIBLIVE.COM
(Mar. 19, 2007), http://triblive.com/x/dailycourier/news/mountainarea/s_
498395.html#axzz2e38YY2EI (discussing negative impact that Hoge decision had on
Pennsylvania landowners as coal companies could freely drill for coalbed natural
gas as result of conveyance of right to coal).
156. See, e.g., Broughton v. Nw. Natural Gas Co., 2 Pa. D. & C.4th 226, 227–28
(Ct. Com. Pl. 1988).  The court stated:
We note that this anachronistic presumption has come before the courts
of this county in recent decades for interpretation.  We presume that
other counties where oil and gas drillings have sprung into existence af-
ter about 1950 have been plagued with the “Dunham problem” when
drafting attorneys or individuals entering into agreements, leases or con-
veyances which reserved mineral rights were not aware of the Dunham
decision and proceeded under the nearly universal assumption that a res-
ervation of mineral rights included reservation of oil and gas interest in
the land.
Id. at 228.  When examining a reservation of minerals, the Broughton court sug-
gested that “the parties and the court are again plagued by the ancient case” of
Dunham v. Kirkpatrick. See id. at 227–28.
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portunity to correct its misapplication of common law decisions through
the Dunham Rule, and presumptively declare natural gas a mineral.
Critics of the change argue that rejecting the Dunham Rule would
destabilize oil and gas law across the state.157  But, in instances where the
law has been misapplied, Pennsylvania courts have questioned whether the
misapplication should continue, despite their strong commitment to stare
decisis.158  Furthermore, in some cases, departures from longstanding
property laws are necessary to adapt to a dynamic world and economy.159
In support of the change, at least one author has noted that overruling the
Dunham Rule would not have a significant negative impact on the Com-
monwealth or its property owners.160
V. NAVIGATING THE DUNHAM RULE: A GUIDE FOR PRACTICING ATTORNEYS
For the foreseeable future, Pennsylvania attorneys will undoubtedly
face challenges associated with the Dunham Rule.161  To address Dunham
Rule litigation regarding past conveyances, attorneys should either raise or
anticipate the issue of Pennsylvania’s second line of Dunham Rule cases and
be prepared to clarify whether the application of the Hoge decision to
157. See PA Supreme Court Upholds Dunham Rule on Mineral Rights, ERG ENERGY
RES. GROUP (May 28, 2013), http://pa-erg.com/2013/05/28/pa-supreme-court-
upholds-dunham-rule-on-mineral-rights/ (“Removing the Dunham rule from the
books would have caused chaos in the state’s drilling industry and been disastrous
to the thousands of leases and royalty agreements already in place.”).
158. See Schriver v. Meyer, 19 Pa. 87, 93 (1852) (“If the law was totally misap-
plied in that case . . . must we therefore continue to misapply it as often as the
other shares come up for discussion?  Because we or our predecessors have
wronged one man by our blunders, must we therefore wrong forty-three others for
the sake of our own consistency?”). But see AG Serv., Inc. v. T.W. Phillips Gas & Oil
Co., No. CIV.A. 91-0650, 1994 WL 762150, at *13 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 19, 1994) (“Even if
a state court ruling appears to be outdated and obsolete, a federal court must
follow that ruling unless the court has sufficient evidence for believing that the
state’s highest court would no longer adhere to that rule.”).
159. See Troy A. Rule, Property Rights and Modern Energy, 20 GEO. MASON L.
REV. 803, 803 (2013) (detailing current topics in property rights and explaining
need for development and adaptation of property laws to keep pace).  Penn-
sylvania courts have also recognized a need to develop common law regarding
mineral rights as new disputes arise. See, e.g., Chartiers Block Coal Co. v. Mellon,
25 A. 597, 598 (Pa. 1893) (“It is the crowning merit of the common law, however,
that it is not composed of ironclad rules, but may be modified to a reasonable
extent to meet new questions as they arise.”).
160. See Dale A. Tice, Opening Pandora’s Box?  Calling Shale Gas Rights into Ques-
tion, 34 PA. LAW. 24, 27 (Mar.–Apr. 2012) (“Various commentators have expressed
opinions as to the ultimate outcome of Butler v. Powers, generally suggesting that
concerns about the potential for this case to upset well-settled property law have
been exaggerated.”).
161. See generally Ian Urbina & Jo Craven McGinty, Drilling Down: Learning Too
Late of the Perils in Gas Well Leases, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 1, 2011), http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/12/02/us/drilling-down-fighting-over-oil-and-gas-well-leases.html?
pagewanted=all&_r=0 (reporting that Pennsylvania landowners that have leased
their mineral rights were frequently uninformed and uncounseled regarding their
rights before signing leases).
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Marcellus shale is appropriate.162  To prevent disputes that may invoke the
Dunham Rule, when drafting mineral conveyances today, Pennsylvania at-
torneys should consider including meticulously specific language in the
conveying instrument to clarify the exact intent of the parties involved.163
A. Past Conveyances
The Butler decision, while arguably intending to avoid litigation, may
actually bring to light more issues to be litigated in Pennsylvania courts.164
Litigation as a result of the Butler decision will likely continue to focus on
the definition of all minerals in a past conveyance.165  Further, the Butler
decision calls into question whether natural gas trapped in different strata
may be subject to different conveyance rules based on its location.166
1. Deeds Conveying “All Minerals”
In Pennsylvania, a deed conveying some derivative of the term “all
minerals” is currently subject to the Dunham Rule.167  However, in reaf-
firming the Dunham Rule, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court failed to rec-
ognize, discuss, or distinguish a line of Pennsylvania cases that considered
natural gas a mineral.168  These cases both provide a potentially viable al-
ternative to the Dunham Rule and meet the Butler court’s requirement that
the court would not disturb a longstanding rule of property.169
162. For a discussion of approaching litigation regarding the Dunham Rule
post-Butler, see infra notes 164–81 and accompanying text.
163. For a discussion of drafting considerations in a future mineral convey-
ance, see infra notes 182–85 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g., Burcat & Bockis, supra note 148 (discussing potential questions
raised by Butler decision).  Federal courts are also likely to decline jurisdiction over
mineral rights issues. See, e.g., Shychuck v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 13-
373, 2013 WL 2558161, at *1–3 (W.D. Pa. June 11, 2013) (declining jurisdiction
over action seeking declaratory judgment regarding rights under oil and gas
lease); Cabot Oil & Gas Corp. v. Jordan, 698 F. Supp. 2d 474, 479 (M.D. Pa. 2010)
(declining jurisdiction over action seeking declaratory judgment regarding validity
of oil and gas lease, recognizing “broader context in which the dispute at issue
arises,” and recommending adjudication in state court).
165. For a discussion of how to approach litigation regarding a conveyance of
all minerals, see infra notes 167–77 and accompanying text.
166. For a discussion of the types of natural gas contemplated by a convey-
ance of natural gas, see infra notes 178–81 and accompanying text.
167. See Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 897 (Pa.
2013) (“[T]he [Dunham] rule continues to be the law of Pennsylvania.”).
168. For a list of Pennsylvania cases finding that natural gas is a mineral, see
supra note 143 and accompanying text.  For a list of non-Pennsylvania cases refer-
encing Pennsylvania courts finding that natural gas is a mineral, see supra note 144
and accompanying text.
169. See generally New Shawmut Mining Co. v. Gordon, 43 Pa. D. & C.2d 477,
483–96 (Ct. Com. Pl. 1963) (discussing parol evidence under Dunham Rule), aff’d,
234 A.2d 426 (Pa. 1967) (per curiam).  A practicing attorney should also consider
whether a landowner entering into a conveyance with a company that is widely
known to commercially produce natural gas is sufficient evidence of a landowner’s
intent to include natural gas in the conveyance.  The Gordon court found that a
29
Wilhelm: "All" Is Not Everything: The Pennsylvania Supreme Court's Restric
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2014
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\59-2\VLR205.txt unknown Seq: 30 30-APR-14 12:04
404 VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 59: p. 375
The Hoge decision provides a second argument for departing from
the Dunham Rule in the case of Marcellus shale gas.170  Instead of arguing
that a conveyance includes Marcellus shale gas, an attorney should argue
that the conveyance includes Marcellus shale itself and then prove that
Marcellus shale is a mineral.171  While this argument was raised in Butler,
the Pennsylvania Supreme Court did not actually address the issue.172
However, if Marcellus shale is a mineral, it follows by analogy that the Hoge
analysis should apply to Marcellus shale: i.e., whoever owns the shale owns the
gas.173
Finally, Pennsylvania law is concerned with understanding the intent
of the parties in a mineral conveyance.174  Nevertheless, the nature of
most conveyances is not centered on a list of specific minerals.175  Instead,
conveyances are meant to preserve and realize the value of substances
trapped beneath the ground.176  If Pennsylvania courts are attempting to
discern the intent of parties to a conveyance, they should examine what
value the parties understood was being exchanged instead of what detailed
list of minerals was potentially conveyed.177
mining company’s mere inclusion of the words “boring for” and “crude” in its
charter was insufficient to demonstrate intent to transfer oil or natural gas in a
conveyance. See id. at 483.  However, the court implied that if the company’s char-
ter specifically contemplated the commercial production of oil or natural gas, the
substances likely would have been conveyed. See id. at 483–84.
170. For a discussion of the Hoge decision, see supra notes 79–84 and accom-
panying text.
171. Cf. Andrus v. Shell Oil. Co., 446 U.S. 657, 672–73 (1980) (holding oil
shale discovered prior to 1920 Mineral Lands Leasing Act to be valuable mineral
pursuant to Title 30, Section 22 of the United States Code). But see Elkhorn City
Land Co. v. Elkhorn City, 459 S.W.2d 762, 765 (Ky. 1970) (holding sandy shale not
mineral due to its abundance and proximity to surface). See Brief of Appellees at
22–24, Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885 (Pa. 2013) (No.
27 MAP 2012), 2012 WL 8681646 (arguing for Marcellus shale as mineral); see
generally Debra Dobray, Oil, Shale, Tar Sands, and the Definition of a Mineral: An Old
Problem in a New Context, 22 TULSA L.J. 1 (1986) (surveying characterization of cer-
tain substances as minerals across varying jurisdictions).
172. For a discussion of the Butler court’s analysis of whether Marcellus shale
is a mineral, in which it actually analyzed whether Marcellus shale gas is a mineral,
see supra notes 108–13 and accompanying text.
173. Cf. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Hoge, 468 A.2d 1380, 1383 (Pa. 1983) (“[S]uch gas
as is present in coal must necessarily belong to the owner of the coal . . . .”).
174. Cf. Brookbank v. Benedum-Trees Oil Co., 131 A.2d 103, 107 n.6 (Pa.
1957) (detailing general process of contract interpretation in Pennsylvania).
175. For a discussion of the analysis of the intent of parties in a mineral con-
veyance in Pennsylvania, see supra notes 70–73 and accompanying text.
176. See Stewart Title Guar. Co. v. Owlett & Lewis, P.C., No. 4:12–CV–00770,
2013 WL 3784126, at *2 (M.D. Pa. July 18, 2013) (“[D]uring the last half of the
Nineteenth Century and first half of the Twentieth Century, it was common and
customary practice for property owners in this region to reserve all, or a portion, of
the oil, gas, and mineral rights when conveying property . . . .”).
177. See In re Conveyance of Land Belonging to City of DuBois, 335 A.2d 352,
357 (Pa. 1975) (“A deed is to be interpreted in light of the conditions existing
when it was executed.  The entirety of the language is to be considered.”); see also
Trout Run Hunting & Fishing Club v. Hochberg, No. 10–02400, 2012 WL 7659263
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2. Deeds Conveying “Natural Gas”
The Butler court clearly stated that the origin of natural gas, and its
method of extraction, was immaterial to natural gas’s classification as a
non-mineral.178  If landowners have conveyed their mineral rights and ex-
pressly included natural gas, the conveyance could include one of three
currently commercially viable forms of natural gas: traditional natural gas,
coalbed gas, and Marcellus shale gas.179  Therefore, a blanket conveyance
of natural gas includes all forms of natural gas.180  This interpretation is
consistent with a recent Pennsylvania statute that allows natural gas com-
(Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov. 25, 2012) (holding conveyance including “all our right, title
and interest in and to the mineral rights,” but not specifically including natural
gas, did convey natural gas because previous deed included explicit reference to
natural gas).  There is a high standard for proving through parol evidence that the
parties to a conveyance intended to include natural gas. See Day v. Meyer, No. 10-
02455, 2011 WL 7758320, *6–7 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 30, 2011) (examining stan-
dard of evidence required to prove inclusion of natural gas in mineral
conveyance).
178. See Butler v. Charles Powers Estate ex rel. Warren, 65 A.3d 885, 899 (Pa.
2013) (“[T]he basis of the Dunham Rule lies in the common understanding of the
substance itself, not the means used to bring those substances to the surface.”).
179. See Unconventional Natural Gas Formations, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., PIPELINE
& HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMIN., http://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/
UnconventionalNGFormations.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2014) (describing six basic
categories of natural gas found in United States: deep gas, tight gas, gas-containing
shales, coalbed methane, geopressurized zones, and Arctic and sub-sea hydrates).
See generally MICHAEL RATNER & MARY TIEMANN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R 43148,
AN OVERVIEW OF UNCONVENTIONAL NATURAL GAS: RESOURCES AND FEDERAL ACTION
(2013), available at http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43148.pdf (overviewing
unconventional natural gas and its commercial production).
180. See Hoffman v. Arcelormittal Pristine Res., Inc., No. 11CV0322, 2011 WL
1791709, at *5–6 (W.D. Pa. May 10, 2011) (rejecting argument that deed convey-
ing natural gas, executed decades prior to viable commercial production of
Marcellus shale gas, should not be included in grant because Marcellus shale gas
was unknown and therefore could not have been contemplated by drafting par-
ties).  The Hoffman court further stated that all the words in the deed should be
interpreted to understand the full meaning of the conveyance. See id. at *5 (“The
fact remains that the language of the Deed is clear and unambiguous and it
reserves the rights to all oil and gas . . . .”).  Some authors have suggested that the
Hoffman decision is contrary to the Dunham Rule in that Hoffman does not ex-
pressly seek to interpret the intention of the parties to the conveyance. See Joel R.
Burcat & George Asimos, “What Keeps You up at Night?”, SAUL EWING LLP: OIL &
GAS PRACT. GROUP (Sept. 2011), http://www.saul.com/media/alert/2593_pdf_
3034.pdf (discussing potential application of Hoffman decision to Dunham Rule);
see also Brief for Appellant at 10–13, Kowcheck v. Pittsburgh Terminal Realization
Corp., 64 A.3d 34 (table) (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012) (No. 1936 WDA 2011), 2012 WL
6059216 (arguing Marcellus shale gas could not be conveyed under intent analy-
sis).  The lower court rejected this argument, stating, the “deed clearly reserves ‘all
oil and gas under said tracts of land’ in the grantor.”  Kowcheck v. Pittsburgh Ter-
minal Realization Corp., No. 2009-4328, 2011 WL 9753960 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Nov.
14, 2011).
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panies to extract Marcellus shale gas when the conveyance only contem-
plates natural gas.181
B. Future Conveyances
For the foreseeable future, the Dunham Rule will continue to reflect
the law of natural gas conveyances in Pennsylvania.182  Fortunately, parties
to an oil and gas conveyance have the opportunity to limit the impact of
the Dunham Rule and Butler decision.183  To avoid future Dunham Rule
implications, parties should explain, in detail, the minerals included in the
written conveyance.184  Parties should also consider including limiting lan-
guage in the conveyance to reinforce the specific intention of the parties
as to which minerals are to be conveyed.  Additionally, as the final step of
any natural gas conveyance, the conveyance should be properly recorded
to avoid any subsequent title disputes.185
181. See 58 PA. CONS. STAT. § 34.1 (2013) (“Where an operator has the right
to develop multiple contiguous leases separately, the operator may develop those
leases jointly by horizontal drilling unless expressly prohibited by a lease.”).  The
statute was intended “to enhance the efficient development of oil and natural gas
while safeguarding the rights and protections of landowners and leaseholders.”
Letter from Tom Corbett, Governor, Pa., to the Gen. Assemb. of Pa. (July 9, 2013);
see also Marie Cusick, Corbett Signs Controversial Bill Giving Drillers Power to Pool Leases,
NPR STATE IMPACT (July 9, 2013), http://stateimpact.npr.org/pennsylvania/2013/
07/09/corbett-signs-controversial-bill-giving-drillers-power-to-pool-leases/. But see
Marc Levy, Corbett OKs Bill Strengthening Driller Rights, PHILA. INQUIRER (July 10,
2013, 3:24 PM), http://www.philly.com/philly/business/homepage/20130710_
ap_9d6719539cad49b08e2c11b8ecb2ffcb.html (discussing new Pennsylvania legis-
lation that “undermines some landowners’ negotiating rights when dealing with
Marcellus Shale drilling companies”).  Critics argue that the new legislation limits
landowners’ ability to negotiate for additional consideration to drill for Marcellus
shale gas. See id. (criticizing new legislation). See generally Joseph Iole, May Two
Laws Occupy the Same Space at the Same Time?  Understanding Pennsylvania Preemption
Law in the Marcellus Shale Context, 6 APPALACHIAN NAT. RESOURCES L.J. 39 (2011)
(analyzing potential implications of Pennsylvania’s recent oil and gas legislation).
182. See Butler, 65 A.3d at 900 (Saylor, J., concurring) (“[T]oo many settled
expectations rest upon [the Dunham Rule] for the courts to upset it
retroactively.”).
183. See id. (“[P]arties certainly have the ability to negate the impact of the
Dunham decision by making their intentions clear on the face of the written instru-
mentation.”). See generally Krista Weidner, Natural Gas Exploration: A Landowners
Guide to Financial Management, PENN ST. EXTENSION (2009), available at http://
pubs.cas.psu.edu/FreePubs/pdfs/ui394.pdf (explaining, for landowners, impor-
tant considerations before signing natural gas lease).
184. See Higbee Corp. v. Kennedy, 428 A.2d 592, 597 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1981)
(“[T]he grantor, as draftsman of the deed, bears the heavy burden of using clear
and unambiguous language to make explicit his intent to create this type of oner-
ous limitation to an estate in land.”); see also 21 PA. CONS. STAT. § 3 (2013) (stating
statutory requirements for proper conveying instrument).
185. See 21 PA. CONS. STAT. § 356 (requiring recordation of “[a]ll agreements
in writing relating to real property situate in this Commonwealth”).  Landowners
severing the mineral estate from the surface estate must also report the severance
to local taxing authorities. See 72 PA. CONS. STAT. § 5020-409 (codifying common
law land ownership reporting requirements); Hutchinson v. Kline, 49 A. 312,
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VI. CONCLUSION
For landowners like Bill Hartley, mineral rights provide a viable
means to maintain their standard of living.186  However, in order to pre-
serve landowners’ interest in their properties, Pennsylvania needs to reject
the Dunham Rule in favor of a more comprehensive understanding of a
conveyance of minerals.187  The purpose of the Dunham Rule is to inter-
pret a conveyance in accordance with the understanding between the par-
ties, which the Rule, due to changing times, fails to do.  Instead, the
decisions perpetuating the Dunham Rule rely on years of outdated tradi-
tion.188  Today, Pennsylvania landowners and attorneys must structure
conveyances to avoid the pitfalls of this outdated rule of property.189
317–18 (Pa. 1901) (requiring reporting of mineral severance to local assessor);
Heft v. Gephart, 65 Pa. 510, 517 (1870) (explaining owners of unseated land have
duty to report ownership to local taxing authority).  Also, as with any business
transaction, parties should be mindful of the tax implications that may impact total
profits from a mineral right conveyance. See generally I.R.S. Oil and Gas Handbook,
IRM 4.41.1 (Dec. 13, 2013), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/irm_04-041-
001.html#d0e10 (explaining federal examination methods for oil and gas reve-
nue); Marcellus Education Fact Sheet: Tax Treatment of Natural Gas, PENN ST. EXTEN-
SION (2011), available at http://pubs.cas.psu.edu/FreePubs/PDFs/uh190.pdf
(summarizing tax implications of natural gas conveyance in Pennsylvania includ-
ing federal income tax and property tax).
186. See, e.g., Erich Schwartzel, Amish Riding Wave of Gas-Drilling Boom, TOLEDO
BLADE (Feb. 3, 2013), http://www.toledoblade.com/local/2013/02/03/Natural-
gas-leases-could-help-Amish-sustain-agrarian-tradition-experts-say.html (explaining
some Amish communities in eastern Ohio and western Pennsylvania have em-
braced natural gas drilling because of drilling’s economic opportunities); Anne
Kates Smith, Cash in on the Natural Gas Shale Boom, KIPLINGER (Nov. 2011), http://
www.kiplinger.com/article/business/T019-C000-S002-cash-in-on-the-natural-gas-
shale-boom.html (describing Pennsylvania family that leased mineral rights to pay
bills, buy farm machinery, and invest balance for future).
187. For a discussion of why Pennsylvania should depart from the Dunham
Rule, see supra notes 142–60 and accompanying text.
188. For a discussion of the Butler court’s role in Pennsylvania’s tradition of
perpetuating the Dunham Rule, see supra notes 119–37 and accompanying text.
189. For a discussion of how to navigate the Dunham Rule after the Butler
decision, see supra notes 161–85 and accompanying text.
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